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THE EUROPEAN WAR OF 1914:

Its Causes, Purposes, and Probable Results

THE EUROPEAN WAR OF 1914:

ITS CAUSES, PURPOSES, AND PROBABLE RESULTS

By

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PREFACE

THE contents of this little book were prepared some months ago, but its appearance has been intentionally delayed until this time. I am not sure that its publication even now is not premature.

It is a fact of history as well as personal experience that the majority is generally on the wrong side of every great question in the beginning. I myself have seen this country in hysteria four times during my own conscious existence. The first time was the Anti-Abolitionist craze, when the North as well as the South rose in what men then fancied to be righteous indignation against these assailants of the existing order and the public peace, the despised Garrisonians, but what really was only the rage of a guilty conscience trying to deaden itself to the knowledge of the sin it was supporting. And then in less than five years I saw these same men leading the vast choir of the majority and singing the battle hymn of freedom.

The second time was the greenback craze and the third time was the free-silver craze, when, in spite of the jejuneness of the subject, the great majority were so affected by it and worked themselves up to such a pitch of self-righteousness against the rascals, who would make the debtor pay in appreciated money, as almost to silence their contention for a sound and honest currency. It took all of the official and moral power of four Presidents, Grant, Hayes, Cleveland, and McKinley, to stem this torrent of popular holiness, make men exercise a little common sense, and feel a little common honesty. And yet I hardly know a man today who is not ashamed if his grandfather was touched by either of these follies.

And now for six months we have had the Anti-German craze, perhaps the most unreasonable of all — for who is so blind as not to perceive with a glance that the united triumph of the Autocrat of the Land and the Autocrat of the Sea means their dominance of the world; and what have the Germans ever done

to us to deserve abuse at our hands — but perhaps the most explicable of them all, for if the majority has so little correct understanding, in the beginning, of domestic questions, such as I have cited, how can it be expected to have any comprehension whatever of a great foreign movement, epochal in civilization, such as that with which the European world is now convulsed?

It was quite inevitable that the attention of the vast majority should be riveted primarily upon some of the nearer lying, more unimportance, incidents of the movement, and that these should be misinterpreted and these misinterpretations become exaggerated until they should finally assume the form of caricature and catchword. There are some evidences at present that we are beginning to emerge from this spell of excited and misguided feeling and to look at things more calmly and objectively. It is this which has encouraged me to release this little volume for publication at this juncture.

March, 1915. J. W. B.

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THE EUROPEAN WAR OF 1914

CHAPTER I

THE OCCASIONS OF THE WAR

TO a man who, for nearly fifty years, has been accustomed almost daily to read and interpret diplomatic papers, and whose profession it was for nearly forty years to teach others how to read and interpret them, it seems a remarkable phenomenon that the British White Paper has been, with such unanimity, in this country, assumed to show that Sir Edward Grey was the prime apostle of peace throughout the period of active diplomatic intercourse just preceding the outbreak of the war which is now devastating Europe. I have read all of the numbers of this paper through many times and can repeat verbatim the language of those which are pivotal and crucial, and I am quite sure that

there is another way to interpret that paper, a way more consistent in theory, more intelligible throughout, and more naturally connected with preceding movements, than the interpretation so generally regarded in this country as the only possible one.

In approaching this subject I will ask my readers to keep three things well in mind. The first is that this British White Paper does not present the causes of this war nor its purposes, but only the occasions of it. The causes of the war lie far back of anything contained in this paper. They are, as will be demonstrated more fully in the next chapter, the determination of Russia to dominate the Balkan lands and to extend her empire to the Bosphorus, the Ægean, and the Adriatic; the determination of France to make conquest of Elsass-Lothringen, and the determination of Great Britain to repress the political, industrial and commercial growth of Germany. These three things constituted for years before the outbreak of this war the chief perils threatening the life and prosperity of

the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So long as they could be kept apart, peace could reign in Europe, but when they were brought together in what was first called the Triple Entente, and this Entente was developed into the Military Alliance of August, 1914, then peace left the world, when to return God only knows. This British White Paper is simply the history, from the British point of view, of the way in which this development was accomplished.

In the second place, let it be always kept in mind that diplomatic papers are not sermons by sincere God-fearing clergymen, nor scientific essays whose purpose is the demonstration of truth, but that the language of them is frequently chosen and employed to cover up the real purpose and to produce results different from, sometimes contradictory to, those professed to be desired. In reading diplomatic papers, one must be able to read not only between the lines, but behind the lines and before the lines and around the lines, and one must never forget that the re-

sults actually produced were those probably intended by the successful party.

In the third place, one must remember that most diplomatic correspondence is verbiage and is modified by secret verbal agreements. One must be able to select the parts which contain the gist of the proposition or the argument and free it from the nebulosity with which it is surrounded, for the most part intentionally surrounded, and to apprehend the verbal understandings which give them their real meaning.

Naturally, the first thought of the world after the brutal murders of the Crown Prince and Crown Princess of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on June 28, at Sarajevo, was what Austria-Hungary would do about it. Nobody entertained the idea that such crime would be allowed to pass unpunished. The Austro-Hungarian government began immediately an investigation which lasted until the close of the third week in July, and on July 23 it made declaration of what it had discovered and what it intended to do.

It affirmed that it had found that the assassination of the Prince and Princess was planned in Belgrade; that high Servian officials were implicated in it; that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officials and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, the society for exciting revolution among Austrian Servians against the Austro-Hungarian Government; and, finally, "that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and effected by the chief officials of the Servian frontier service."

The Austro-Hungarian Government furthermore declared that the assassinations at Sarajevo were connected with, and the natural outcome of, subversive movements for disrupting the Austro-Hungarian Empire and detaching certain of its parts, which had been for years in progress in Servia; that these movements were participated in by members of the Servian race living or sojourning in the Austro-Hungarian Empire; that the Ser-

vian government itself knowingly allowed these movements to go on unhindered in the press, in the schools, and in the revolutionary societies, in spite of the promises which that government had, March 31, 1909, made to the Austro-Hungarian Government of friendly and neighborly conduct; and that the Austro-Hungarian Government could not, in view of this situation, "pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which they had maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched at Belgrade and thence propagated in Austria-Hungary," but were now in duty bound to put an end to the intrigues which formed a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Empire.

On the basis of these statements and explanations the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded of the Servian Government that it should publicly proclaim in its official journals that the government condemned the propaganda against Austria-Hungary and repudiated it, regretted the participation of Servian officials in it, deplored its criminal

results, and warned both officials and private persons that it would proceed with the utmost rigor against anybody who should thereafter be guilty of attempting to promote it.

The Austro-Hungarian Government also demanded, more specifically, the suppression of publications inciting the people to actions against the peace and integrity of Austria-Hungary, the dissolution of all societies in Servia whose aim was the promotion of this propaganda, the elimination from the public instruction of everything encouraging the same, the removal of all officials from the public service guilty of promoting this propaganda, the arrest and trial of those officials shown by the Austro-Hungarian inquiry to have been implicated in the assassinations of June 28, the prevention of illicit traffic in arms and explosives from Servia across the frontier between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the dismissal and punishment of the Servian frontier officials who had facilitated the work of the assassins, and explanation of the utterances of high Servian officials

approving the murder of the Prince and Princess.

Finally, in order to make sure that the Servian Government would sincerely meet these requirements, the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded that representatives of Austria-Hungary should be allowed to cooperate with the Servian Government in the inquiry as to the accomplices on Servian territory in the murders of the Prince and Princess, and in the suppression of subversive movements directed against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This was a firm and decided demand, but it was required by the necessities of the situation. Here was a turbulent community — I will not call it a state, because one of the chief characteristics of a state is that it is organized, legalized morality — a turbulent community guided largely in its acts and purposes by insurgents, conspirators, and regicides, a community which had already twice, between 1908 and 1914, by its lawless conduct brought Austria-Hungary to the verge

of war, a community which had, between the same periods, been under solemn and express pledges to Austria-Hungary to cease its intrigues and machinations against that country and to live in frank and friendly relations with it, but which, in constant disregard of this pledge, and of its duty independent of the same, continued to weave its plots for the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and finally instigated the foul murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian crown, with the purpose of producing just what has happened, namely: a European war for the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian and the German Empires. The demands, therefore, on the part of Austria-Hungary that this criminal conspiracy and these criminal acts against her existence should immediately cease, as well as the press and school propaganda encouraging them, and that the chief conspirators should be brought to justice, and that this should be undertaken under such cooperation on the part of Austro-Hungarian representatives as would make it rea-

sonably certain that it would be effectively accomplished, were well within the boundaries of the provocation.

Only a little more than a year ago our government demanded that a Mexican Government should step down and out because our President believed that Huerta had had some part in the assassination of his predecessor, Madero, and our government enforced this demand. Let us suppose now that our own Vice-President and his wife had gone for an official visit to Austin, Texas, and had there been assassinated, in the execution of a plot hatched in Mexico City, in which the highest officials of the Mexican Government had been found to be implicated, and for the accomplishment of which the weapons had been furnished from the Mexican Governmental arsenal, and that the murderers and weapons had been knowingly passed across the frontier by Mexican officials, and that all this had been done as part of a conspiracy formed in Mexico, by the leaders of the country in and out of the government, for detach-

ing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from the United States and re-connecting them with Mexico — what would the United States have done? In view of what she did do, I think it fair to say that she would have slapped Mexico off the face of the earth, and that in case any other power in the world had interfered she would have told it to attend to its own business and stand aside or it would be slapped aside also.

The question between Austria-Hungary and Servia was thus one involving the honor and existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a question, therefore, in which, according to the existing canons and practices of diplomacy, no other power had any right to interfere, and which, according to these same canons and usages, was not subject to arbitration. Moreover, the purpose of this demand was entirely punitive. It was not an issue under which Austria was seeking her own aggrandizement or to disturb the balance of power in Europe. She solemnly declared that she would annex no foot of Servian terri-

tory, and as a matter of fact she was striving to maintain the balance of power in Europe disturbed and thrown out of joint by the machinations of the powers of the Triple Entente through the Italian Tripoli expedition and the recent war of the Balkan powers against Turkey.

I have in my possession at this moment a statement from an important officer of the British Crown, which is dated September 16, 1914, and contains the following paragraph:

> My own private opinion is that Grey has utterly outmanoeuvred the Germans. He began the game by getting Italy to annex Tripoli. Practically that was the end of the Triple Alliance, as now we have a million of hostages in North Africa, and Italy dares not stir against us. Then came the Balkan League financed by England and France and, but for the idiotic vanity of King Ferdinand, we should have had the war then. For the last three years England, France, and Russia have been steadily preparing for the struggle and Germany stupidly played the enemies' game.

The seduction of Italy, thus, from the Triple Alliance, and the Balkan war against

Turkey, ending in the driving back of Turkey and in weakening her as a weight against Russia in the Balkan peninsula, were the things which had, by the beginning of the year 1914, so changed the balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente as to threaten the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. All the powers in both of these combinations understood this perfectly and Great Britain more than any other, and Sir Edward Grey more than any other man consciously brought it to pass.

Immediately after the assassinations at Sarajevo, which revealed to Austria-Hungary that the conspiracy against her existence had become active, the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey struck out upon a line entirely consistent with the antecedents to which I have called attention, a line destined to bring war, a line which has brought war, and a line which if not intended to bring war is evidence of great dulness in the mind of its inventor. Before the demands of Austria-Hungary had become known, he began inquiring of the

German Ambassador in London and, through Great Britain's representative in Berlin, of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, about them. The German Ambassador declared that he had no information on the subject, but the British *Chargé* in Berlin telegraphed to him, Grey, that the German Foreign Minister

> insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference from outside in the discussions between these two countries; that he had, therefore, considered it inadvisable that the Austro-Hungarian Government should be approached by the German Government on the matter. — *(British White Paper No. 2, July 22, 1914.)*

This was absolutely the correct attitude diplomatically towards the subject, and it was the insistence of Great Britain and the other powers of the Triple Entente to depart from it which started the ball rolling in the wrong direction.

On the next day Sir Edward Grey had a rather sharp discussion with Count Mens-

dorff, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, in which he protested against a time limit, which Count Mensdorff had indicated might be contained in the Austro-Hungarian demands, and virtually threatened him with Russian interference. Count Mensdorff called attention, in justification of a time limit, to the fact that Servia had utterly disregarded her plighted word, given five years before, to live on neighborly terms with Austria-Hungary, and had pursued her hostile purposes against Austria-Hungary, and that it had become necessary for Austria-Hungary to protect herself promptly. Moreover, Count Mensdorff indicated to Sir Edward Grey that St. Petersburg was the place where restraint should be exercised. — *(British White Paper No. 3.)*

On July 24, the contents of the Austro-Hungarian demand upon Servia were communicated by Count Mensdorff to Sir Edward Grey, and the latter immediately declared to the former that he had "never before seen one state address to another inde-

pendent state a document of so formidable a character," and remarked that Great Britain would enter into an exchange of views with other powers.—*(No. 5.)*

On the same day Sir Edward Grey received a dispatch from the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg which manifested a high state of excitement on the part of the Russian government. It ran: Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken such action unless Germany had been first consulted; some of her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped that His (Britannic) Majesty's government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France. The Ambassador went on to say that in his opinion Russia and France had already determined to intervene between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that the Russian Foreign Minister had informed him that he thought that Russian mobilization would have to be carried out.—*(No. 6, July 24.)*

Here now was the great opportunity for a peace-loving British Foreign Minister, if he were genuinely peace-loving and not a pretender, to get in the finest work of his life. What would such a British Foreign Minister have replied to the excited requests from Russia to intervene in this Austro-Hungarian-Servian question. I think he would have said:

This is a local question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, a question in regard to which we have no right to intervene, and we must keep our hands off. Moreover, it is a question involving the honor and existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a question, therefore, which, according to the canons of diplomacy, is not arbitrable, and we should not insist upon, or propose, its arbitration. It is true that we may think the demands on Servia peremptory, but we must consider that foul murders have been committed, the murder of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his wife, and that Austria-Hungary claims that this has been accomplished by the cooperation of Servian officials in execution of a plot formed at Belgrade, a plot for disrupting the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

And we must remember that Servia is a rest-

less, turbulent community, a community in which, only ten years ago, high officials, the leaders of the party still in power in Servia, wantonly assassinated their own King and Queen and pitched their dead bodies out of the window to be kicked and spat upon by the mob, a community which has long been the firebrand of Southeastern Europe, while Austria-Hungary is a great, highly-civilized state which has rendered inestimable service to the culture and civilization of Europe, among many other things, in halting and settling the Magyars, in defending Europe against the invasion of the Moslem, and in holding the Slav, the Magyar, and the German together in the bonds of a peaceful empire for the last fifty years.

We must trust the word of Austria-Hungary, which during the last few years has manifested great forbearance toward Servia, that she will exact only a just measure of satisfaction for the crimes that have been committed against her. If it should prove later that she is going beyond this and is encroaching upon general European interests, then will be the time for us to interfere. To do so before then would be immoral and provocative on our part.

Now do we find anything like this from Sir Edward Grey in the numbers of the Brit-

ish White Paper? I cannot discover it, but instead of it we find just what, as it seems to me, a very clever diplomatist would do, who desired to bring about a war of extermination against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and at the same time throw the responsibility for it upon the shoulders of his victims. Now what would be the elements of the plan of such a foreign minister intent upon such a purpose? Would it not be as follows?

1. To assume the correct diplomatic attitude for his own government of non-interference in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but at the same time to encourage Servia to resist the demands of Austria-Hungary by pronouncing them extravagant and peremptory.

2. To encourage some other power, in this case Russia, to interfere between them by representing that Russia had some special legitimate interest in intervening, some special right to intervene.

3. To propose arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary raised by the intervention of Russia in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

4. To represent Germany as responsible for the failure to bring about arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary, without explaining that this was really arbitration of the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

5. To do nothing to restrain Russian mobilization.

6. To encourage France to sustain Russia.

7. To refuse to enter into any understanding with Germany on any conditions.

8. To find, at the last moment an issue, an apparently unselfish issue, under which to enter into the great struggle.

Now let us see from the evidence contained in the British White Paper itself if this was not the exact course of the diplomacy followed by the British Foreign Minister.

(First.) Did he encourage Servia to resist the Austro-Hungarian demands?

On July 24, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London "that he had never before seen one state address to another independent state a document of so formidable a character," criticising par-

ticularly the demand made by Austria-Hungary that Austro-Hungarian representatives should be allowed to cooperate with Servian officials in the investigation relating to the participation of Servian officials and subjects in the assassination at Sarajevo, and in suppressing the movements against the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the same time, he disclaimed any concern on the part of his government with the merits of the dispute between Austria-Hungary and Servia.—*(British White Paper No. 5.)*

On the same day, he telegraphed to the British *Chargé d'Affaires* at Belgrade that Servia ought to give Austria-Hungary fullest satisfaction should it be proven that Servian officials had had any part in the Sarajevo murders, that Servia "*ought certainly* to *express concern* and *regret;*" for the rest, however, that "the Servian government must reply to the Austrian demands *as they consider best in Servian interests.*" * *(No. 12.)* The *Chargé* was authorized to repeat this to

* Italics mine, J. W. B.

the Servian Government after consulting his French and Russian colleagues at Belgrade. That the Servian Government understood completely the position of the British Government as encouraging Servia to resist the Austro-Hungarian demands is clearly manifest from the telegram sent by the British *Chargé* at Belgrade to Sir Edward Grey after the reply of the Servian government to the Austro-Hungarian note, which telegram reads: "I have been requested by the Prime Minister to convey to you the expression of his deep gratitude for the statement which you made on the 27th inst., in the House of Commons."— *(No. 83.)*

(Second.) Did Sir Edward Grey encourage Russia to intervene in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia?

On July 24, he instructed the British Ambassador in Paris that if Russia took the view of the Austro-Hungarian demands on Servia, which it *seemed to him any power interested in Servia would take,** he would

* Italics mine, J. W. B.

be powerless to do anything with Russia. *(No. 10.)* Of course this communication was immediately imparted to the French Government and from the French Government to the Russian Government.

On the 25th, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the peremptory character of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia made it almost inevitable that Russia and Austria-Hungary would quickly mobilize against each other. *(No. 24.)*

On the 25th, he instructed the British Ambassador at Vienna to support the steps taken by the Russian Ambassador at Vienna in making a demand upon the Austro-Hungarian Government for an extension of the time limit imposed by the Austrian note for the Servian reply and for furnishing data on which the Austrian note was based. *(No. 26.)* Here was not only an encouragement to Russia to intervene in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia, but a participation in that intervention, and that, too, after the disclaimer of any concern on the part of

his government in the merits of the question, as noted in No. 5.

On the 27th, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that Germany and Austria-Hungary ought to understand from the concentration of the British fleet that Great Britain might not stand aside.— *(No. 47.)*

(Third.) Did Sir Edward Grey propose mediation of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary raised by the intervention of Russia in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia?

On the 25th of July, he telegraphed to the British *Chargé d'Affaires* in Berlin that he had said to the German Ambassador in London that Russian and Austro-Hungarian mobilization would apparently soon take place and that he had suggested mediation between them by Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.— *(No. 25.)*

On the 26th, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador in Paris his proposition for mediation in so general and comprehensive

terms that when it was repeated to the British Ambassador in Vienna and communicated by the latter to the Russian and French Ambassadors there, these men said that while they felt satisfaction with the proposition *"they doubted whether the principle of Russia being an interested party entitled to have a say in the settlement of a purely Austro-Servian dispute would be accepted by either the Austro-Hungarian or the German Government."* *—*(Nos. 36 and 40.)*

On the 27th, he informed the British Ambassador in Berlin that he had said to the German Ambassador in London that the Servian reply had gone farther than could have been expected and that the German Government should urge moderation at Vienna.—*(No. 46.)*

His proposition at that moment was that the German Government should urge upon the Austro-Hungarian Government to make the Servian note, which rejected the crucial demands of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-

* Italics mine, J. W. B.

ment, a basis for discussion. The German Government felt great embarrassment in doing this, feeling that it might irritate the Austro-Hungarian Government, but yielded to the British request.

That the German Government was correct in this forecast was immediately shown by the answer of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the proposition, namely, that it was too late for that, and by the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Servia. *(No. 75.)* Evidently the German Government was diplomatically correct in its desire to treat the Austro-Hungarian-Servian question as a matter between those two states alone, and that in yielding to the persuasions of Sir Edward Grey to step in, where neither it nor any other government had any right to interfere, had come dangerously near to getting a snub from its only ally.

The position of the German Government was now most embarrassing. It had no such influence over the actions of Austria-Hungary as has been ascribed to it by the all-wise

newspaper editors. Austria-Hungary is the proudest state on the European Continent and one of the oldest. Its imperial-royal house wore the crown of Charlemagne for 500 years, and, in its view, the German Empire is a newcomer. Its diplomatists are among the most skilled and accomplished statesmen of Europe. Of course, they were justly offended at Russia's assuming to forbid Austria-Hungary from securing such satisfaction for her grievances against Servia as she considered necessary to her honor and safety. Of course, they knew that Great Britain was acting with duplicity in pretending to hold to the correct attitude of non-interference for herself and at the same time encouraging Servia to resist and Russia to interfere. And of course, they felt that their German ally should not yield to either Great Britain or Russia or both in giving any countenance to such a departure from correct and usual diplomacy.

Sazonof and Grey knew these things, too, but, instead of giving due weight to the

embarrassment of the German Government, they undertook to make it the scapegoat in their work of developing, through these incidents, the Entente into a Military Alliance. They not only cared nothing for the embarrassment they were creating for Germany in declaring that Germany's control over Austria-Hungary was the key to the situation, but it was with them a new point gained to increase, at every turn and move, that embarrassment in order to alienate, if possible, Austria-Hungary from Germany. That this embarrassment was clearly understood by the British Government is to be surely concluded from the dispatch received July 29 by Sir Edward Grey from the British Ambassador in Berlin. It reads:

I found Secretary of State very depressed today. He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate matters and present a *fait accompli.* This had in fact now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of your suggestion that Servia's reply offered a

basis for discussion had not hastened the declaration. *(No. 76.)*

(Fourth.) Did Sir Edward Grey attempt to make it appear that Germany was responsible for the failure to bring about arbitration of the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary without explaining that this was really arbitration of the unarbitrable question between Austria-Hungary and Servia?

On July 29, he telegraphed to the British Ambassador in Rome that he had anticipated the German objections to mediation by the powers by asking the German Government to suggest any form of procedure under which it might be applied. *(No. 92.)* He claimed that the German Government had accepted the proposition for such interference by the powers in principle, although the German Government had expressed great misgivings about the interference of the powers in such a question and had suggested direct communication between Russia and Austria-Hungary as the proper mode of dealing with it.— *(No. 43.)*

The trouble was that the German Government regarded Sir Edward Grey's proposition for mediation as being practically arbitration, and had held from the first, quite correctly, that the question between Russia and Austria-Hungary was in substance the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia and was not arbitrable. While Sir Edward Grey sought to give another meaning to his proposed mediation, he still made no distinction between questions which might be properly brought under it and those which might not, which was the point of embarrassment for the German Government. The world, however, can, he knew, be relied on to take things more in the rough and to regard objection to mediation as evidence of desire for war. The British White Paper evidently encourages this view.— *(No. 84.)*

(Fifth.) Did Sir Edward Grey do anything to restrain Russian mobilization?

On July 29, he received official notice from the British Ambassador in Berlin that Russia was mobilizing her forces against Austria-

Hungary. *(No. 76.)* Also from the Russian Ambassador in London. *(No. 70.)* On the same day, he gave the German Ambassador in London to understand that Great Britain would not attempt to exert any influence upon Russia to stand aside in the question between Austria-Hungary and Servia and allow those two states to settle it themselves. *(No. 90.)* At the same time he indicated to the Austrian Ambassador in London that he regarded Russia as having some particular interest in Servia.—*(No. 91.)*

On July 31, he received from the British Ambassadors in Berlin and St. Petersburg notice that Russia was mobilizing on the German frontier, at the very moment when, on request of the Czar, the Emperor was attempting to secure an understanding between Russia and Austria-Hungary. *(Nos. 108 and 113.)* And on the same day he instructed the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg that the German Ambassador in London had asked him "to urge the Russian

Government to show good will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations," and that he had said to the Ambassador that he "did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her troops into Servia." *(No. 110.)* On the same day he received the thanks of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs for his attitude.— *(No. 120.)*

(Sixth.) Did Sir Edward Grey encourage France to sustain Russia?

On July 29, he informed the British Ambassador in Paris that he had told Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, that so long as the question was one between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Great Britain would not feel called upon to take a hand in it, but if Germany became involved and France became involved, then Great Britain would have to consider, and that the French Ambassador had indicated that this was satisfactory, since if Germany attacked Russia, France was bound to help Russia. *(No.*

87.) Both of these men knew, of course, that if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary, Germany was bound, under the provisions of the Triple Alliance, to go to the aid of Austria-Hungary. This would not in reason be an attack by Germany on Russia, but France was determined to so regard it. In fact, Grey and Cambon had arranged for such a situation two years before.—*(No. 105.)*

Sir Edward Grey also informed the British Ambassador in Paris in this dispatch that he was on the point of informing the German Ambassador in London that Germany must not presume upon the neutrality of Great Britain. He also referred to the fact that the British fleet, which had some time before been concentrated in the Channel, ostensibly for a review, had not been dispersed, in other words that the British fleet was mobilized. This was all intended, of course, for the French Government and could not have failed to assure France that if, in a war between Russia and Germany, France should

take up arms in support of Russia, Great Britain would take up arms in support of France.

When, therefore, Germany asked France if she would remain neutral in a war between Russia and Germany, France replied that she would consult her own interests.

On August 2, Sir Edward Grey received from the British Ambassador in Berlin information that he, the Ambassador, had just been informed by the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs that owing to the fact that Russian troops had crossed the German frontier, Germany and Russia were in a state of war. *(No. 144.)* And on the same day he, Sir Edward Grey, handed the French Ambassador in London a memorandum which read: "I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." *(No. 148.)* Everything was now prepared for Great

Britain to join with France and Russia, and the final task of Sir Edward Grey was to find the issue under which to bring this about.

(Seventh and Eighth.) Did Sir Edward Grey refuse all understanding with Germany, and finally effect the participation of Great Britain in the war under a feigned issue?

What that issue was to be is first indicated in the White Paper. *(No. 101, dated July 30.)* It is a dispatch sent by Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador in Berlin for communication, of course, to the German Government. The tone of it is altogether different from the usually quiet manner of this gentleman. It is excited and extravagant and recriminatory. It is the tone of a man who is conscious of the weakness of his position and is seeking to strengthen it by magnifying some apparently vulnerable point in the position of his adversary with the intent to put his adversary in a false position.

In this dispatch he virtually accuses the German Chancellor of trying to strike a bar-

gain with Great Britain whereby Great Britain should remain neutral while Germany should violate the neutrality of Belgium. This dispatch was an answer to one he had received from his Ambassador in Berlin on the preceding day informing him that the German Chancellor was most desirous to remain on friendly terms with Great Britain and was ready, in case Great Britain would remain neutral, in the event of war between Germany and France, to give Germany's pledge not to take any French territory in Europe. The only thing said about the neutrality of Belgium by the Chancellor was that it would depend "upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium."

When this heated communication from Sir Edward Grey was conveyed to the Chancellor, he was occupied with the menacing position of Russia on the eastern frontier and he merely asked the British Ambassador to leave the message with him for reflection before answer.— *(No. 109.)*

Sir Edward Grey now put the question to both the German and the French Government whether they were prepared to give assurances of respecting the neutrality of Belgium. *(No. 115.)* It is to be presumed that Sir Edward Grey meant the neutrality of Belgium as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1839. This Treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. It had never been signed nor ratified by the present German Empire. Did the German Empire, originating thirty-two years after the signing of this Treaty and composed of twenty-four other states besides Prussia, inherit the obligations of Prussia? If so, had Belgium herself done anything or agreed to anything before August 1, 1914, which could be regarded as imparity of treatment by her of her guarantors and thus absolving the prejudiced guarantor from his obligations? I will not undertake to answer these questions, although I know the German Government claimed that she had. *(No. 122.)* I raise them only to show that Germany and France

did not stand in the same position over against this question put to them by Great Britain.

Moreover, as against France, Great Britain could only be neutral or an *ally*. As against Germany, on the other hand, Great Britain could only be neutral or an *enemy*. The French Government could, therefore, answer at once and in the affirmative without endangering its own interests. The German Government, on the other hand, felt obliged to assure itself of the neutrality of Great Britain before giving any pledge in regard to Belgium.

On August 1, the German Ambassador in London asked Sir Edward Grey, whether, if Germany promised not to invade Belgium, Great Britain would engage to remain neutral, and Sir Edward Grey answered that he could not say that. The Ambassador then pressed Sir Edward Grey to formulate conditions upon which Great Britain would remain neutral and suggested the willingness of Germany even to guarantee the integrity

of France and the French colonies on condition of the neutrality of Great Britain, and Sir Edward Grey refused to promise neutrality upon any terms, even of his own making, and declared his refusal to be definitive.— *(No. 123.)*

The German Empire here virtually proposed the same arrangement in regard to Belgium as that entered into by Great Britain and the North German Union and Great Britain and France in 1870, namely, that Great Britain should, in a war between Germany and France, remain neutral and with Germany guarantee Belgium against invasion by France, and with France guarantee Belgium against invasion by Germany, and Great Britain refused. Great Britain thus indicated to Germany that she had determined to become a belligerent enemy to Germany in the impending war and would not agree to remain neutral under any conditions proposed by Germany or formulated by herself.

On the next day, August 2, Sir Edward

Grey, without waiting for the final answer of the German Government to his demand that Germany should, without regard to the attitude of Great Britain, promise not to invade Belgium, gave, as we have already seen, assurance to France that Great Britain would participate in the impending conflict as the ally of France. *(No. 148.)* With this, Germany was finally made to realize that the three great powers, commanding half the world in area and population, were resolved to make war upon her, in fact were already at war with her, and that her only chance was to strike quick and hard and where the danger was most immediate.

Now this is how I read the British White Paper. It is the way that one hundred and fifty millions of people in Europe read it, not only Germans and Austrians, but Swiss, Dutch, Danes, Scandinavians, and some Englishmen, and it is the way that twenty-five millions of people in this country read it. I believe it is the way every unprejudiced historian and diplomatist will read it twenty-

five years from today. And it shows one of two things, namely: that Sir Edward Grey consciously intended to bring about this war, at this time, from the moment that he encouraged Servia to resist Austria-Hungary and encouraged Russia to assert a protectorate over Servia, or that he is a dullard and was an unwitting tool in the hands of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonof.

I would rather think the latter, but in the way of this stands his war speech in Parliament on August 3. It must be remembered that at the time this speech was made the telegrams and dispatches contained in the later-published White Paper, which we have been citing, were known only to the British Cabinet. Parliament and the people of Great Britain had no knowledge of them until several days later.

In this war speech, Sir Edward Grey suppressed the propositions contained in No. 123 of the British White Paper and in the Emperor's telegram to King George of Au-

gust 1, in which Germany went the whole length of virtually offering to agree not to go to war with France at all, provided only Great Britain would remain neutral and guarantee that France would do likewise; or, in case Great Britain could not restrain France, not to invade Belgium and not to make conquest of any French territory, European or colonial, provided only great Britain would herself remain neutral.

The fact that Sir Edward Grey did this most reprehensible thing, and, at the most critical moment, left the impression upon the mind of Parliament and the people that the German Government had made no reply to the British demands about Belgian neutrality, indicate that he was playing the game of war-maker and not peace-maker. The war was already an established fact as between Russia and Germany, and he seems to have been determined not to allow Germany to escape from the mortal peril of war on her western as well as her eastern boundary at the same time. In other words, he seems

consciously to have seized this promising opportunity for forcing Germany to solve her problems with the different states of Europe all at once and against their combined power.

Even Englishmen doubt whether the British Cabinet could have brought the Parliament and the people to the approval of its war policy without that bit of deception practiced on them by the Foreign Minister in that speech of August 3. Three members of the Cabinet, the most honest and genuinely patriotic men in it, Morley, Burns, and Trevelyan, left the Cabinet rather than to be participant in this policy; J. Ramsey MacDonald, member of Parliament, denounced Sir Edward Grey in unsparing terms for his disingenuousness; Arthur Ponsonby pointedly asked the question in an article in the London Nation: "Did the Prime Minister in referring to what he called the infamous proposal at the same time draw attention to the German Ambassador's request, *at a later date,* that we should formulate the conditions on which we would re-

main neutral?" and answered it "no," and C. H. Norman declared that "Sir Edward Grey laid a snare for the House of Commons, out of which, in the excited condition of public opinion, the House could not be extricated with honor and dignity."

Moreover, Sir Edward Grey declared in this same speech of August 3, that the British fleet was already mobilized and that the army was mobilizing, that the forces of the Crown were ready and that, in the opinion of the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty, there was never a time when those forces were in a higher state of readiness and efficiency than at that moment. With regret I am compelled to say that through his own utterances, Sir Edward Grey seems to me to convict himself of having consciously followed a course of conduct leading directly to universal war.

Let us now turn to the causes of the war and examine if they do not sustain this interpretation of the British White Paper.

CHAPTER II

THE PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE WAR

FOR a correct and exhaustive understanding of these we must go back at least to the formation of the present German Empire. After the disrupture of the German Confederation in the year 1866, by the withdrawal or expulsion of Austria from this connection, the French Empire became the leading state of Continental Europe, at least west of Russia.

According to the well established principles of British diplomacy, France was then the state whose wings must be clipped and it was Great Britain's problem to find "some George who would do it." This was not difficult. The formation of the North German Union in 1867, embracing all of the German States north of the Main, and of the German Zollverein, including all the

members of the old German Confederation, except Austria, excited the apprehension of France for her leadership in Continental Europe.

France sought an opportunity for war with the North German Union in the year 1870 and found it in the Spanish question. We must not, however, delude ourselves with the idea that this question caused the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. The cause of that war was the determination of France not to allow the North German Union to grow into the present German Empire. The Spanish question was only the pretext.

What attitude would now the other powers of Europe assume towards the conflict? Russia had not forgiven France for the defeat in the Crimean War of 1853-56. She, therefore, remained neutral. Italy was still mourning over the loss of Savoy and Nice, which she had been obliged to transfer to France for Napoleon's aid in her supreme effort for the expulsion of the Austrians in 1859, was also still suspicious of the plans

of France for gaining a further foothold in her borders, and was resentful at the maintenance of the French garrison for upholding the Pope's supremacy in Rome. This was a sufficient balance to the gratitude of Italy towards France for the latter's assistance in 1859 to keep Italy quiet in 1870. Austria was still smarting under the defeat of 1866, but her partner in the dual monarchy, Hungary, had profited by it, and whatever intentions hostile to the North German Union Austria may have entertained were suppressed by the rapid and decided victories of the North German arms.

Lastly, Great Britain saw, at that moment, in the French Empire her only possible rival on the sea and had not forgotten the long struggle with France for the mastery of the sea. The growth of Germany as a Continental power merely did not seem to threaten her interests, but rather to be a protection to her against French colonial aspirations. The one point necessary to her traditional policy was to prevent the coast of the Chan-

nel from Dunkirk to Antwerp from falling into the hands of either party, that is, to maintain the independence of Belgium. Napoleon had already revealed intentions upon Belgium, and although the Treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and signed by Great Britain, France, and Prussia, as well as Russia and Austria, had never been formally repealed, yet Great Britain deemed it necessary, for the safe-guarding of her own interests more than those of Belgium, and for their safe-guarding rather against France than against the North German Union, to exact from France and the North German Union separate but identical treaties with her, guaranteeing during the period of the impending war and for a year following its close the neutrality of Belgium. Under these treaties she was willing to remain neutral and let the war take its course.

While the triumph of the German arms and the organization of the German Empire by the union of the South German States with the North German Federation did not

seem to give the British Statesmen much concern, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine seemed to require some explanation in order to give assurance that this was not the first step in a policy of conquest to be followed by the new German Empire. It was of course easy to show historically that Germany was only reclaiming her own, but the more convincing justification was that the mountain range on the west side of this territory was the natural military boundary on the southwest between Germany and France, and that its possession by France was a constant menace to German unity and safety. This was Germany's chief ground, and it was satisfactory to Europe generally, except to France herself. To France it was the symbol of her reduction from the first to the second place among the states of Continental Europe west of Russia. The determination of France to regain her leadership made itself concrete in the Alsace-Lorraine cult and indicated thus to the shewd diplomats of Europe what note to strike in dealing with

France in order to charm and seduce her to their purpose.

The new Empire was conscious at first of danger chiefly, if not wholly, from France, and shaped its policy and diplomacy to meet it. It built the University at Strasburg, introduced compulsory education for stamping out the general illiteracy of the people in the annexed territory, established sanitary reforms therein, improving the housing of the residents of the towns and villages and clearing away slums and the proletariat of which they were the haunts, taught the peasantry better methods of agriculture, and promoted new industries in the towns for the profit and welfare of their inhabitants. Anyone who knew by personal observation, as I did, the Alsace-Lorraine of 1871 and the Elsass-Lothringen of forty years later, could not help feeling astonishment and admiration for the vast improvement of the people in education, health, vigor, industry, enterprise, and prosperity, within this period.

At the same time that the new Empire

began inaugurating these reforms for the well-being of Elsass-Lothringen, it effected diplomatically an understanding with Russia and Austria-Hungary, in what was called the "Three Emperor Alliance" of 1872, for maintaining the peace of Europe. As a young student in the University of Berlin, I witnessed the meeting of the three Emperors, William I, Alexander II, and Francis Joseph in the Lustgarten at the head of the Linden between the Palace of Frederick the Great and the Museum, and remember distinctly the high hopes for permanent peace, contentment, and prosperity in Europe which were expressed in connection therewith.

But, alas, in less than five years from that promising September day, Russia blasted the hopes which she had helped to raise by entering upon the campaign for the harvesting of the fatal legacy bequeathed by Peter the Great to his successors, the policy of the conquest of Constantinople. The Powers stood quietly by and saw her march her armies almost to the gates of the City and dictate

to the humbled Turks the Treaty of San Stefano. Then they interfered, in the interest of Europe, against this unconscionable aggression, and required Russia to lay the Treaty for revision before the powers gathered in Congress at Berlin. That Congress was dominated by the British Premier, Lord Beaconsfield, and the German Chancellor, Prince Bismarck, and it ameliorated the hard terms of the Treaty and saved the Ottoman Empire from destruction.

From that moment Russia began to change her feeling and policy towards the German Empire and to cultivate a rapprochement with France. The astute Bismarck perceived the change and worked with all his might to check it. He did finally, in the year 1884, succeed in inducing Russia to enter with Germany into a neutrality agreement for a few years in case either should be attacked by a third power. When this period expired Russia turned away from all agreements with Germany and gravitated towards France.

So soon as Bismarck became aware of Russia's displeasure in 1879, he had turned to Austria-Hungary and had formed with the Hapsburg Empire a defensive alliance directed chiefly against Russian attack. Four years later, in 1883 — some writers place it a little earlier — when the approach of Russia to France had become clearly manifest, Italy joined this Alliance, called thereafter the Triple Alliance, which was now directed against an attack upon either member of the Alliance by either Russia or France.

The keynote of Bismarck's policy was the consolidation of the German Empire as a Continental European state and the pursuance of a world policy, that is a policy of colonial expansion and foreign trade, only in so far as it did not endanger the Continental position and interests of the Empire. From the location of the Empire in the middle of Europe, surrounded by powerful states already regarding it with dislike, this was most necessary. Under such conditions it was most difficult to adjust properly the

elements of such a policy. Already by 1890 Germany had emerged from the stage of an agricultural community and was fast becoming a great manufacturing and commercial state. This had been made necessary by the rapid increase of her population, which could with difficulty be supported by agriculture alone upon her two hundred and eight thousand square miles of territory. But this change required foreign markets, and Spain, France, Holland, and lastly Great Britain had taught the world that the way to get and preserve these was by the establishment of colonies.

There is no doubt that it was with considerable apprehension that Bismarck brought himself to take over some unclaimed African territory and begin the establishment of a German colony. He soon experienced the jealous watchfulness of Great Britain, but for this once he turned it to advantage in yielding to British demands in South Africa, acquiring as compensation for Germany the island of Helgoland. This was accomplished

in the year of his retirement from office, 1890, in fact under his successor, and it corresponded with his policy of looking out first for the interests of the Empire at home. It was also a point gained that Great Britain was induced to recognize that Germany had any right to appear outside of her Continental boundaries.

Whether the approach of France and Russia was facilitated by this event or not we do not surely know, but we do know that in 1894, the understanding between them had ripened into a treaty, the contents of which were kept secret, but which we must now conclude pledged the two, at an oportune moment, to make war upon Germany.

Germany understood the danger and sought to avert it by encouraging Russia to pursue her policy of expansion in Asia, hoping thus to deliver Europe from her encroachments. Germany, therefore, supported Russia in the year 1895 against Japan in Russia's effort to keep Japan from the Pacific coast at the points where Russia might

find an ice-free port for the Pacific terminus of her Siberian Railway. This irritated Japan against Germany and the vindictive little yellow man watched patiently for his opportunity to revenge himself, which has at last come. In 1898 Germany leased from China some two hundred square miles of territory, the port of Kiau-chau and placed thus a pawn in the reach of Japan. At the same time Russia leased Port Arthur at the head of the Liao-tung peninsula from China and created thus a point of friction between herself and Japan.

From 1890 to 1898, Germany, all the time in rapid development as a great manufacturing and commercial state, had acquired not over two thousand square miles of territory for colonial purposes, and the most of this was not intended for colonization but simply for coaling and supply stations, while Great Britain, France, and Russia were seizing hundreds and hundreds of thousands of square miles of territory by military force all over the world. Germany had already

begun to learn, thus, that foreign trade might exist without colonies, in fact was more profitable without them, if only the doors of all countries should be made open and kept open.

For some time Germany had been looking upon the Turkish Empire in Asia as a new and profitable region for trade, and in the year 1898 the German Emperor made his famous visit to Constantinople, Damascus, and Jerusalem, and in the year 1900 a German company or syndicate received a concession from the Turkish Government to build and operate a railroad from Constantinople through the middle of the Turkish Empire in Asia to the Persian Gulf. In the same year, 1900, the Navy Bill for the systematic and continuous development of the German Navy was passed by the Imperial Parliament and became law.

The German idea was that, instead of following any further the expensive and destructive and immoral policy of dismembering the Turkish Empire, it would be more eco-

nomical, constructive, and humane to maintain its integrity, and to seek its regeneration by bringing it into closer contact wtih Europe and the world, through active trade, commerce, and communication. The German idea was prompted not only by the desire to extend German trade, not only by the desire to help on the development of the inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, and not only by the conviction that the Turks were the best fitted among all the races of the Empire to govern, but also by the desire of removing the Turkish question, that is, the question of the partition of Turkey, as the great disturbing factor of European peace, from the arena of European politics; while the purpose of the development of the fleet was to be able to protect the rapidly growing German merchant marine and commerce against all possible attack and unlawful interference.

Great Britain, on the other hand, evidently did not understand the German idea or did not trust the German intentions. Her states-

men appeared to apprehend that the intentions of Germany were territorial acquisitions in the Turkish Empire and naval hostility to Great Britain. Great Britain had practiced the policy of territorial aggrandizement so long as the solution of the commercial question that it was very difficult for her to understand that there could be any other solution.

At the same time the Russian activity in Asia was giving Great Britain great concern about her possessions and position upon that vast continent, and the support of Germany to Russia in keeping Japan out of the Liaotung peninsula suggested to the British diplomatists the existence of some more friendly relations between Russia and Germany than they had before this supposed.

After the accession of King Edward in 1901—I will not venture to say in consequence of it—the diplomacy of Great Britain towards Russia and Germany seems to have been based on those suspicions. An understanding between Russia, Germany, and

Turkey in the Asiatic question could to the British mind mean just one thing, namely, the shunting of Russia away from Constantinople and from the bay of Alexandretta and her advance from the Trans-Caucasus through Persia to the Persian Gulf. Here Russia would at last reach the open sea and have an ice-free port. But she would then flank India. This mortal danger to the British Empire must, at any cost, be averted. It is to this task that the British diplomacy of the years between 1901 and 1914 has addressed itself.

Judging from the conversations in the political centres of Europe, from occasional statements coming from highly informed and responsible sources, and from the course of events during that period, the plan of the British Government then formed and now pursued by force of arms is the acquisition of the vast territory lying between Egypt and the Levant on the west and lower Persia on the east, the connection of the same with Egypt and the ports of the Levant by a

railroad leading from Alexandria to the Persian Gulf, and the establishment, probably at Mecca or Cairo, of a new Caliphate of the Mohammedan believers, under the control of the British government. This would defend the British possession of India in two ways, namely, from territorial aggression by Russia, possibly supported or countenanced by Germany, and from the spiritual power of the Turkish Sultan as Caliph of all Mohammedan believers, and it might open the way some day for the acquisition of all Mohammedan North Africa by the British Empire.

Now how could such a gigantic plan be realized? Naturally the first and entirely indispensable step must be the turning of the supposed new friendship between Russia and Germany into hostility, and the weakening of both Russia and Germany. Let us see whether this was the course which Great Britain pursued. It has been recently asserted by persons closely connected with the German Government that in 1902 Great

Britain offered Germany an alliance with herself and Japan, the point of which was directed against Russia, and that Germany declined it. Japan, on the other hand, entered into it and in less than two years began the war upon Russia with the purpose of driving Russia back from her outlet upon the Pacific at Port Arthur and in Manchuria. In this she was successful and the results were most advantageous to Great Britain. Russia, weakened by defeat and revolution, was driven back upon Europe, that is upon Germany and Austria-Hungary, and rendered incapable of pursuing her policy of expansion in Asia, and Germany and Austria-Hungary were compelled to face the probability of Russia's resuming her traditional policy of seizing Constantinople.

This first and most important step in the realization of the British plan for connecting Egypt and India having been thus successfully taken, the British diplomatists could now advance to the second. This second step was to remove the participation of France in

the administration of Egypt, leaving Great Britain thus the sole power therein, subject of course, for the moment, to the nominal sovereignty of the Turkish Sultan, and at the same time to gain the support of France for the acquisition of the territory between Egypt and Persia. The opportunity for this came at the very moment of Russia's defeat by Japan.

France had been for several years maneuvering and intriguing with Spain for the seizure and partition of Morocco. When Great Britain became aware of these movements in 1904, perhaps earlier, she manifested opposition, of course, but immediately improved the opportunity for getting rid of the French right of participation in administering the finances of Egypt, and for getting the consent of France for the acquisition of the vast territory between Egypt and Persia, by agreeing to the French occupation of Morocco. But Germany now stepped in and demanded the submission of the Morocco question to a Congress of the Powers.

France regarded this as very impertinent on the part of Germany and her spirit of revenge for 1870 received a new incitement. Nevertheless Germany insisted and the Congress of the Nations at Algeciras was assembled in 1906. This Congress ordained the independence and integrity of Morocco, under her own Sultan, accorded certain very limited police powers to France, Spain, and Switzerland therein, and decreed the open door for the trade of all the nations therewith. We shall see a little further on how France disregarded these provisions of the Algeciras Convention, and how Great Britain protected her disregard of the pact.

With Russia weakened by defeat and revolution, with her French ally dependent upon British support in Africa, and with Germany again apprehensive of the revival of Russia's designs upon Constantinople, Great Britain was now, as third step in the realization of her plan, able to bring Russia to the Persian Agreement of 1907, according to which Russia recognized the southern half of

Persia as belonging to the sphere of British influence, as they call it, which is nothing more nor less than the preliminary to annexation. With this Russia gave up the route to the open sea on the south through Persia and the Persian Gulf. This she certainly would never have done had not advantage been taken of her extreme exhaustion, because this is the only route by which she can immediately reach the open sea on the south. The other routes lead only to the Mediterranean, and Great Britain guards both outlets of this lake into the open sea.

Moreover, it was to be surmised that Great Britain would oppose the passage of Russia from the Trans-Caucasus over Armenia to the harbor of Alexandretta in the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. Russia once in possession of the plateau of Armenia would not only command all of the routes from Asia into Asia Minor, but could occupy at pleasure the entire valley of the Euphrates and the Tigris down to the Persian Gulf. This would conflict with the

British plan for annexing Mesopotamia to Egypt, and would bring the two great land-grabbing Empires of the world face to face across the imaginary line of the surveyor.

Great Britain would certainly prefer the Turk to the Russian for her neighbor. She would certainly prefer to have Russia take Constantinople than Armenia and Alexandretta. In fact after the agreement of 1907, and by it, Russia was brought back to the conviction that her aspiration to reach the sea on the south was, as to its probable fulfillment, confined to the route through Constantinople. But from the moment of the conclusion of that Treaty of 1907, the route to Constantinople, lay, as the Russians now say, through Berlin. In other words, the plan of Great Britain for the annexation of Southeastern Turkey and Arabia to Egypt, the Treaty of 1907 with Russia as to Southern Persia, the German Bagdad Railroad, and the alliance of France with Russia and Great Britain, left, of all the great powers, united for the defense of the

integrity of the Ottoman Empire in the Congress of 1878 at Berlin, only Germany and Austria-Hungary, and ranged Great Britain with her old foe in this question, Russia, with whom she is now endeavoring to destroy and despoil the Ottoman Empire, at the same time that she holds the island of Cyprus in trust as a basis of operations for her pledged defense, especially against Russia, of the integrity of that Empire.

The plans were fast ripening for the blow. In June of 1908 the meeting between King Edward and the Czar took place on shipboard near Reval in the Gulf of Finland, and was almost immediately followed by that between the Czar and President Falliéres of France at the same place. The purpose of these interviews, it is understood, was to arrange for intervention in the affairs of Macedonia, the burning question in the relations between Turkey and her Balkan subjects. Of course, the Entente Powers knew that such intervention by them would meet with objection from Germany and Austria-

Hungary. Italy, the other member of the Triple Alliance, had apparently given ear to the seductions of Russia, exciting her aspirations in South Tyrol and along the Dalmatian Coast and influencing the feelings of the Italian Royal House through its connection with the Princely House of Montenegro. Italy, they calculated, would at least remain neutral and might even be induced to abandon her allies and cast her lot with them.

Then came almost like a thunderbolt out of clear sky the Young Turkish revolution in July, 1908. Its purpose was the establishment of Constitutional Government. It is quite evident that Great Britain was shaken by it more than the other members of the Entente. Great Britain probably supposed that the cordiality between Germany and Turkey was only a cordiality between Germany and the Government of Abdul Hamid and that the overthrow of this Government and the establishment of Constitutional Government with a new Sultan or possibly President would dispel it and substitute therefor a

friendly feeling towards Great Britain as the Mother of Parliaments.

Great Britain did not then understand at all that the cordiality between Germany and Turkey was based upon the conviction on the part of the Turkish people that Germany was only seeking their trade, while Great Britain and Russia were seeking their territory, that it was therefore the interest and purpose of Germany to observe and protect Turkey's integrity and independence, while it was the interest and purpose of Great Britain and Russia to undermine and destroy them.

Whatever may have been the reason, the intervention in Macedonia did not come off. The claimed necessity for it seemed to be forestalled by the establishment of the new Constitutional Government at Constantinople, or, more truthfully said, the pretext for it was stripped of all show of respectability.

But something else did happen which brought Europe to the very brink of war. Bulgaria and the Austro-Hungarian province

of Bosnia-Herzegovina were still subject to the nominal suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan. It was certainly a very slender tie. For thirty years Bulgaria had been essentially an independent sovereign state and for the same period Bosnia-Herzegovina had been administered and developed and really redeemed to civilization by Austria-Hungary. The apprehension now seized upon Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary that the new Turkish Government contemplated the restoration of its actual supremacy over these former Turkish provinces by including them in the representation in the new Constitutional Parliament at Constantinople.

Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary forestalled this danger on the selfsame day, October 5, 1908, by simply repudiating the suzerainty of the Sultan. This suzerainty had been reserved by the Berlin Congressional Act of 1878, that is, by the act of the great powers of Europe represented in that Congress, and it remained now to be seen whether they would intervene and uphold the suzerainty of

the Sultan. It would have been out of all reason for them to have done so, and they did not. Austria-Hungary, however, paid the Porte some ten millions of dollars indemnity. But Servia made a great ado about it and was backed up by Russia. This was a revelation of the plan for holding Bosnia-Herzegovina at least in this relation until Russia should be ready to tear it away by main force from Austria-Hungary, either by the right of might or by capturing Constantinople, succeeding thus to the powers of the Turkish Government, and then reclaiming it through the reserved suzeräinty over it. It was at this critical moment that Germany stepped in and stayed the hand of Russia and preserved the peace of Europe. The plan of the Entente shipwrecked for this once upon the unpreparedness of Russia, the hesitation of Great Britain, and the decision and firmness of Germany.

The following year King Edward passed away and the indecision of the British Government seemed to be increased by this event.

This, together with the hope of at least weakening the friendship between Germany and Turkey, under the new regime, and several other things, such as the supposed friendly policy of the new German Chancellor, the influence of the German example on the new socialistic legislation of the British Parliament and pre-occupation with the Irish question, seemed to modify the attitude of Great Britain towards Germany in the direction of a better understanding of Germany's purposes. Especially did Great Britain seem to show more comprehension of idea that Germany's interests and undertakings in Turkey were economic and commercial, while those of Russia were territorial and political.

But these appearances were quickly dispelled again by the movements of France in Morocco. During the five years between 1906 and 1911, France had been continually doing little things in Morocco, which, by a fair interpretation of the Algeciras Convention, were stretches of the powers conferred upon her, and doing them under pretexts

which she herself created, as for example in the Casablanca affair, where the French officials excited the Moors by desecrating one of their cemeteries and then shelled the town from a warship in order to quell the riot.

Finally, in 1911, France proclaimed that the foreign residents of Fez were in great danger and sent an army of some sixteen thousand men to occupy the capital of Morocco. There was nothing wrong in Fez except the French military occupation of it. That was nothing more nor less than the conquest of Morocco in the face of the Algeciras Convention forbidding it. Spain, one of the signatories of it, immediately occupied a position on the west coast of Morocco, and Germany, another signatory, sent *The Panther,* a little warship, to another place, Agadir, not far away from the position of the Spaniards. Great Britain immediately espoused the French cause, although she herself was one of the signatories of the ruptured Algeciras Convention, and almost threatened Germany with war. The British justified them-

selves for this apparently strange position of upholding the violator of a compact, to which she herself was a signatory, against the protest of another signatory by representing that Germany was seeking at Agadir a naval base for interfering with the trade between Great Britain and South America. But this was only the pretext. The real reason for the British attitude lay a great deal deeper. It was to secure the compensation to France for the French withdrawal of rights in Egypt and the French approval of the British plan for annexing to Egypt the regions between Egypt and Persia. The Germans knew this well enough then, and there were many among them who thought that Germany should have assumed the risk of war at that juncture under the issue of upholding the Algeciras Convention, but the Emperor would have none of it. His diplomatists succeeded in settling the matter peaceably by accepting from France a concession which was barely sufficient to save Germany from humiliation.

During this same time, 1911-1912, another significant movement was in course of accomplishment further eastward. I mean the occupation of Tripoli by Italy. It is most difficult to believe that this was really supported or desired by Italy's allies of the Triple Alliance and there is no evidence that it was. It exhausted Italy's strength at the same time that it exhausted Turkey's strength, and made Italy and Turkey enemies, all of which things were directly contrary to the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary, if Italy was to remain true to her allies. As said in the preceding chapter, I have it from excellent British authority that it was Great Britain which prompted Italy to this adventure, her object being to place Italy in a position where, in case of a war between the Powers of the Entente and the Powers of the Triple Alliance, Italy would not be able to discharge her duty to her allies. This is entirely intelligible. It is also easy to understand that Great Britain might prefer to have Italy as her immediate neighbor in

North Africa rather than France. If it was British diplomacy which instigated this enterprise, it was certainly a fine stroke, and the British Foreign Secretary may well be proud of it. Moreover, the instigation of the Balkan League at this same moment by Great Britain's ally, Russia, against Turkey and Austria-Hungary points to the same origin of Italy's Tripoli enterprise.

The final developments of the proximate causes of the great catastrophe follow now rapidly upon each other. While France and Russia were organizing and financing the Balkan League, Great Britain seemed to become apprehensive of the destruction of Turkey and the advance of Russia to the Mediterranean. She seemed, for the moment, to prefer the German commercial interests in Asiatic Turkey to the Russian territorial projects. It is claimed that some understanding with Germany about the Bagdad railroad was in process of realization. Then the storm broke. The Balkan allies attacked Turkey first, while it is claimed by

many well-informed persons that Russia intended them to attack Austria-Hungary first. During the autumn of 1912 they were generally victorious and drove the Turkish forces back to their last defensible line before Constantinople.

At this moment, in the first days of 1913, Russian military movements from the Trans-Caucasus towards Armenia were discovered. Both Germany and Great Britain understood them fully. They meant the seizure of a broad belt of Turkish territory extending through Armenia to the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. They meant the destruction of the Turkish Empire in Asia, the destruction of the German commercial interests therein, and an uncomfortable nearness of Russia to Egypt and the Suez Canal. In possession of the Armenian plateau, Russia would be able, according to military opinion, not only to reach the bay of Alexandretta, but to occupy at pleasure Syria, Babylonia, and Mesopotamia; in other words, to defeat the British plan for joining Egypt with

Persia by the occupation of the regions lying between them.

Germany again interfered at the critical moment and demanded the cessation of this movement. Great Britain felt that, for the moment, her own interests coincided with those of Germany, and Russia yielded, though with a very bad grace, and with increased anger against Germany. At the same moment the ambitions of Bulgaria ruptured the Balkan League and turned the war against Turkey into a war between the Balkan states. This saved Austria-Hungary for the moment from the attack which the Balkan states, following the victory over Turkey, were to have made upon her. The European war appeared to be again averted and Great Britain seemed to be nearing Germany. But, alas! it was only appearance.

Turned back by Germany from the way through Armenia to the Mediterranean, Russia became now fully determined to revert to the old policy of seizing Constantinople, and Great Britain must have become con-

vinced that of the three ways for Russia to reach the sea on the south, the one through Constantinople would be least injurious to British interests. Great Britain, moreover, understood that Germany and Austria-Hungary would stand across this way also, and that even if Russia succeeded in overcoming their opposition she would come out of the struggle so exhausted that she need no longer be feared, and that also Germany and Austria-Hungary would be weakened, one of the chief points of British diplomacy.

Angered by the opposition of Germany to her plan for seizing Armenia, Russia now turned to her French ally and obtained from her the reintroduction of the three years' term of active military service, raising the peace footing of the active army to 800,000 or more and the promise of a new loan of five hundred million dollars.

The Germans knew only too well that the hour was rapidly approaching, and made their own preparations to meet the increase of military strength on the part of France

and Russia. The German Government still hoped, however, that the danger to British interests involved in the threatened dissolution of the Ottoman Empire by the Russian plan, either by way of Armenia or Constantinople, might deter Great Britain from becoming the military ally of Russia and France in their attack on Germany and Austria-Hungary. But the German Government and the German people did not sufficiently appreciate Great Britain's fear of the German competition in trade and commerce and of the growth of the German Navy.

The British Government must have had serious misgivings. The resignation of three members of the Cabinet is good evidence of that. But the majority of that body evidently reached the conclusion that, after the general exhaustion of the Continental Powers by unrelenting war, Great Britain would be better able to deal with Russia later on than she was then to cope with the rapidly developing power and prosperity of Germany. And so when the Russian puppet in the Bal-

kans touched the match to the train that had thus been laid, and Austria-Hungary sought to defend its own house against the conflagration, the British Government encouraged Servia to resist, encouraged Russia to interfere, encouraged France to support Russia and promised her own support to France. This is the bare and bald truth. All the rest is the diplomatic veil of deception. The history of the proximate causes of the war sustains, thus, the interpretation we have placed upon the British White Paper, and is reconcilable with no other interpretation.

There are, however, still deeper causes for this war which spring out of the irresistible movements and purposes of that Destiny which guides the world through the different stages of its civilization. Let us try to get a glimpse of these.

CHAPTER III

THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE WAR

SOME days ago I read an editorial in one of our leading journals in which the writer said that those persons who were endeavoring to explain the German point of view of the great European movement now realizing itself were simply beating out their brains against the stone wall of American public opinion. It was something for this writer to acknowledge that they had any brains to beat out, and I have no doubt that they are all deeply grateful for the favor, for they have certainly learned to appreciate small favors. I do not know whether the noble writer classes me among those whose brains are now bespattering this adamantine wall. I presume he does. But there is just enough of them left in their original home to evolve this thought as the keynote of this chapter, namely, that there is something still

harder than this stone wall of public opinion, and still harder, though in a different sense, than the bombproof casemate cranium of the man who wrote that editorial. That something is the Destiny which rules this world. It is the power which puts one civilization after another at the head of the column of human progress in the world-historic march towards universal civilization. It shall be our effort in this chapter to gain a point of observation from which we may determine whither this column is advancing and which of the Nations is, for our age, its true leader.

I do not think it difficult for any deep reader of the world's history to satisfy himself as to the first question. Through all the changes of government and empire, through all of the successions of peoples and nations to the leadership, and through all of the turnings and windings and zigzags of the course, he sees mankind ever progressing towards a more and more general distribution of the fruits of civilization, namely, intelligence, education, character, and wealth; and

he sees the leadership in the march passing from hand to hand in accordance with the ability to bring about this wider and wider distribution from age to age.

The second question, however, requires more detailed, if not more exact, examination. Some years ago, in the company of its steward, I was going over one of those magnificent ducal estates in England, which render England the most beautiful spot on earth to look upon. As I viewed its wonderful lawns and pastures and forests, an exquisite expanse for hunt, play, and recreation, I asked the steward whether the products of the estate supported the workers and dwellers on it, not including the Duke and his immediate family. He answered promptly, "No." I then asked him whence the additional sum necessary for their support came. He answered as promptly that the Duke furnished it. I queried again of him as to where the Duke procured it, whether his other country estates were more profitable. He replied: "No," that the Duke's income was from the

rent of his houses in London. I pushed the investigation still further and inquired as to the source of the means of the Duke's city tenants enabling them to pay the Duke rent. He explained that it was manufacture, trade, and commerce; and when I requested to know with whom this commerce and trade were carried on and to whom the manufactured products were sold, he answered again unhesitatingly: "With and to the Colonies as the fixed and regular course and with and to the rest of the world as circumstances permit." Still further, I asked of him whether all the landlords of England were in the same condition economically as the one he served, and his response was in the affirmative.

From these brief but pointed replies I gathered that the British economic system consisted of the following fundamental elements: First, an upper ten to twenty thousand — with their immediate families we will call them fifty to one hundred thousand — owning the land, the houses, and the capital of the British Islands, the Landlords, the

Railroad Kings, the Manufacturing Lords, the Shipping Lords, the Great Bankers, and the Large Importers; second, the division of the land in the country into vast estates, the princely homes of these privileged classes, and used in so great measure for the gratification of the taste of the owners and for their sport, pleasure, and recreation, as to reduce the products of agriculture to about one-fourth of what is necessary for the feeding of the inhabitants of the Islands; third, the gathering of the great mass of the population into cities, the centres of manufacture, trade, and commerce, resulting in overcrowding and the poverty, sickness, vice, and ignorance attendant thereon, that is, in the development of the slum and the proletariat; fourth, a vast Colonial dominion, ever increasing in extent, in which to dispose of the manufactured products of the Islands and from which to draw in exchange the agricultural products to feed them, and from which to draw also mining wealth, official salaries, and liberal interest upon loaned and invested

capital; fifth, a vast merchant marine, sufficient in its strength to control the trade and commerce between the Islands and the Colonial Empire in all parts of the world, and a vast navy, able to sustain and protect this control at will by physical force.

I communicated these thoughts substantially as here stated to my host and asked him whether it was a fair presentation of the existing British economic system. He replied that it was, with the modification that in practice Great Britain permitted free trade between her Colonies and other countries. I said to him that Great Britain can do that safely now (1887), because as a matter of fact she has at this time no real competitor in manufacture and commerce—but suppose some successful competitor should arise? He answered: "We should have to shut them out by law or destroy them by force." But, I inquired finally, would your Colonies acquiesce in a protective tariff imposed by the British Parliament against the rest of the world for the profit of the British manufac-

turer? And he replied: "Possibly not, and in that case we would have to destroy our competitor by physical force."

I cannot perceive that this British economic system has changed substantially between that date (1887) and the present. Between then and now it has been obliged to release Ireland, in large degree, from its clutch, and it has introduced some features of the German pension and insurance system for the relief of its proletariat. On the other hand nearly two millions of square miles more of the earth's surface with the people inhabiting the same have been brought, chiefly by fire and sword, within its control, and the development of American multi-millionairedom with the aspiration of the members of it for British titles has opened up, through international marriage, a new and productive source of contribution and revenue for the British nobility, tending to the preservation of the system.

At the beginning of this century, Mr. Chamberlain and his followers made an ear-

nest effort to ward off the dangers to the system of allowing other countries to trade freely with the British Colonies by proposing the adoption of the high protective tariff principle, but were unable to make the Parliament and the people realize the situation. They did not believe that any other country could successfully compete with British manufacture, and they shrank from the effect upon the Colonies of an attempt to force them artificially to purchase British goods. And so, in spite of some preferences in favor of the British products, the economic system of the Empire was on August 1, 1914, substantially as described in general outline above.

It is a general feature of political history that the governmental system tends to adjust itself to the economic. It is not difficult to see that such an economic system as the British, having, as its keynotes, indefinite Colonial expansion and the control of the commerce of the seas, would require, on the Governmental side, an overwhelming navy, pro-

fessional colonial armies, and a more and more unlimited Government; a Government which can act promptly and decisively and, if necessary, secretly. This is precisely the course taken in the recent developments of the British political system.

During the last ten years, by the invention and construction of the dreadnaughts, the Navy has been made invincible and has won for Great Britain the sovereignty over the seas. At this moment no nation in the world and no combination of nations venture to dispute this or even to assert its or their own heretofore claimed rights thereon against it. At the same time the colonial armies have been strengthened and disciplined and seasoned by action until they are not only capable of suppressing insurrection and revolt, but of extending the boundaries of the Colonial Empire in all parts of the world.

Lastly, the British Government has gradually become a group of Ministers wielding the unlimited powers of the majority in an

unlimited House of Commons. There is no longer a British constitution according to the American idea of constitutional government. With us constitutional government is limited government, government limited judicially by the rights of the individual, expressed and guaranteed by a written instrument, ordained by the sovereign people and interpreted and enforced by the courts, and limited politically by the constitutional distribution of powers between, and the coordination of, separate and independent departments of government. In this only true sense of constitutional government, the British Government is a despotism. There is no judicial body which can uphold the rights of the individual against an act of Parliament; in fact, against an act of Parliament no individual right exists. There is no independent executive which can veto, modify, check, or delay an act of Parliament. And the House of Lords can now no longer thwart or even modify permanently the will of the House of Commons, wielded by the majority party in that

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House, under the leadership of its Executive Committee, the Cabinet of Ministers.

The Russian economic and political systems have more points of likeness with the British than is usually conceived. Substituting the Czar for the almighty House of Commons, and the Grand Ducal circle for the Cabinet, and keeping in mind that the connection of the dependencies with the nucleus of the Empire is territorial instead of oversea, and that, therefore, the necessary organ of military power is a vast army instead of an overwhelming navy, and you have in substance the elements whose play and interplay bring about something like the same results and produce something like the same policy as in the British system. At least we may say that the two are admirably adapted to supplement each other in the conquest of the world. They possess between them now nearly half of it, and if they can only agree between themselves to let the one have the whole of Asia and Continental Europe and the other all the rest, then possibly will the

Millennium be ushered in and, with the Bear and the Lion in loving embrace, mankind may enjoy everlasting peace.

But will the God of History, the Destiny which guides the world's progress, permit such a travesty of the world's civilization, such a mockery of the world's advancement, to accomplish itself in the twentieth century? I cannot believe it. I think that this hand of Destiny is preparing something better, in fact has prepared something better, something which shall emerge triumphant from this great struggle of the nations and, chastened and refined thereby, will, by its example and influence, point the way for the development of man.

The present organization, economic and political, of the German Empire, which also bears in its constitution the more significant title of the United States of Germany, is in very many important respects the opposing counterpart of that of the British United Kingdom and Colonial Empire. Its economic system is by far the most efficient, most

genuinely democratic which exists at the present moment in the world, or has ever existed. There is no great state in the world today in which there is so general and even a distribution of the fruits of civilization, spiritual and material, among all the people as in the United States of Germany. And there is no state, great or small, in which the general plane of civilization is so high. Education is universal and illiteracy is completely stamped out; there are no slums, no proletariat, and no pauperism; prosperity is universal; and the sense of duty is the governing principle of life, public and private, from the highest to the lowest. The institutions of the country are adapted and adjusted to bring each individual person into the place and sphere for which he or she is best capacitated, thus avoiding loss by the abrasions of economic friction.

First and most fundamental of all, German agriculture has been systematically developed, improved, and protected until it has reached the highest point of productive-

ness known to the world. It is a land of small proprietors, where relatively few great estates exist and where the relatively few tenant farmers hold leases of communal land rather than of land in private ownership. Forests are preserved for furnishing wood and lumber and protecting the water courses, but pasture land is limited and the greatest possible area is kept under the plow. Fostered by law, pursued with intelligence and individual interest, and enriched by science, the German agriculture is so intensive that one acre of German land produces as much as three acres of Russian land, although originally poorer and more difficult to cultivate. Feed the people with home product, has been the first principle of the German economic system. With two hundred and eight thousand square miles of territory, an area not as great as our single State of Texas, the United States of Germany can produce all the food absolutely necessary to sustain seventy millions of people. The German Empire does not thus absolutely

require colonies for her food necessities, nor does it need the rent from city houses to keep up its farms and country estates. In Germany the country supports the city more than the city supports the country.

Upon this natural and healthy foundation for their economic system, consciously and tenaciously preserved, the Germans have built their manufactures and their commerce. They have built these carefully, scientifically, and with unwearying industry. They have not allowed factory life to make slums of their cities, nor to produce a proletariat. By requiring employers to contribute with the state and the employees to the establishment of insurance and pension funds, they have secured to labor its proper share in the wealth produced. And by enlisting the personal interest of the employees in the excellence of their own work, they have brought the products of their manufactures to such a degree of perfection that wherever they are admitted they compete successfully with those of any other country.

German commerce therefore is not dependent upon vast colonial possessions. Depots, coaling, and supply stations, of course, it must have, and a strong navy for its protection against the robbers of the sea, but Germany does not find it necessary to her existence to be continually grabbing the territory of the world for colonial markets. The open door is all Germany needs, with the excellence of her manufactures and the efficiency of her commerce and methods of trade, to assure her indefinite industrial expansion. Her economic system is thus not the system of a land-grabbing empire. In the twenty years of her wonderful industrial development between the years 1890 and 1910, she acquired less than two thousand square miles of foreign territory, while Great Britain acquired nearly two million, Russia almost as much, France six to eight hundred thousand, Belgium a million, and even the United States of America about one hundred and fifty thousand, and while Germany acquired the bits of this small area, in about

every case, by purchase or lease, all the other countries seized most, if not all, of their gains by military conquest.

Let us now turn to the German political system and mark its points of difference from that of the British Empire. In the first place it is a federal union of self-governing States. Such a system requires a written constitution to delimit with necessary exactness the relative governmental spheres of the Central Government and the States of the Union. The German political system is founded upon such a Constitution, which was framed by representatives of the governments of the several States, adopted by a convention of popular delegates chosen by universal manhood suffrage, and ratified by the legislatures of the different States.

Besides distributing all governmental power between the Imperial Government and the States of the Union, it distributes the powers of the Imperial Government between the legislature and the executive, conferring upon the Imperial Legislature

—a body the members of one house of which are chosen by universal manhood suffrage and direct election, while those of the other are appointed by the States of the Union—the power to make the laws, and upon the executive, the Emperor, the power to execute the laws or rather to supervise the execution of the laws. The German Government is thus constitutionally limited government, limited politically by the distribution of governmental powers between the Imperial Government and the States of the Union and by the distribution of the powers of the Imperial Government between the legislature and the executive, and limited judicially by the bills of individual rights in each of the State constitutions and by the fixing of certain of the fundamental duties and rights of the individual in the Imperial Constitution.

One among these duties, which must also be regarded as a fundamental right, is the constitutional requirement upon every able-bodied male German to bear arms, and the fixing of the time for which his services are

or may be required, which also means beyond which they may *not* be required. I call this a right as well as a duty. In the Constitution of the United States of America it is so treated, and is declared as follows: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." It is the German way to put the duty first and treat the right as the attending incident. This is the keynote to the German character, political and economic as well as private. The rights guaranteed to the individual by this constitutional provision requiring universal military service are that there shall be no professional army separate from the general citizenship of the Empire with separate interests from those of that citizenship, no inability on the part of that general citizenship, springing from ignorance of the use of arms, to cope with any arbitrary use by government of military power, and that there shall be no power in the Government to require more than the Constitution prescribes.

The so-called German militarism turns out, thus, when correctly understood, to be not only a popular duty but a popular right of the most fundamental and, for Germany, most essential character. It originated in the great efforts of Prussia to rid the German States of the invasions of the first Napoleon. Its spirit and purpose were, therefore, at the outset, defensive, and the point of that defense was first turned against France. But the expulsion of the French from German soil was accomplished by the aid of Russia. Russia was, thereby, introduced into Germany and her influence over the politics of middle Europe became balefully paramount.

In the latter half of the century Russia's so-called Pan-Slavic plans, the plans for the disruption of the Ottoman Empire and the conquest of Constantinople, began to take form, and Germany now found itself compelled to defend middle Europe against the peril threatening it from the east as well as from the west, and this has been its mission to the present day. Down to August 1, 1914,

German diplomacy, backed by German militarism, had been able to keep the peril from the east and the peril from the west apart and to give to Continental Europe such a period of peace and prosperity as it had never before enjoyed, but on that eventful day British diplomacy triumphed over German diplomacy and brought the two perils together and sealed the union by British determination to destroy the naval and commercial power of Germany.

German militarism is, thus, when properly understood, seen to be democratic and defensive. It is the only kind of militarism compatible with popular liberty and constitutional government. It is the permanent, professional army in rank and file which, on the other hand, is dangerous to liberty at home and given to adventure abroad. Moreover, German militarism has been so developed and regulated as to prove rather an economic advantage than an economic burden. This is owing to the fact that the German army is not simply an organization

for drill, discipline, and fighting, but that it is also a school of general physical culture, through which the average life of German men has been increased by ten years and their average capacity for any kind of work by twenty-five per cent; that it is a school of intellectual culture in which, besides military drill and tactics, mathematics, engineering, physics, geography, and sanitation are taught to all the men; that it is a school of moral culture which prevents demoralization and dissoluteness in the young men at the most critical age; that it is a school of politeness in which rudeness of manners gives way to habits of courtesy; and that it is a school of genuine patriotism through which the spirit of provincialism is made to yield to national loyalty. These educational and practical compensations overbalance the economic burden of German militarism and distinguish it from the militarism of Russia and France, although they are all based upon the same principle of universal military service. The system of commandership is, also, much

less autocratic than in the military systems of Great Britain, Russia, or France. The participation in the same by the executive heads of the different States of the Union and the exclusive power of the Federal Council, the upper house of the legislature, to authorize a declaration of war, give the German system a constitutional character and limitation which the others do not possess at all.

Finally, the German communal and local governmental organization is the most perfect known to modern politics. It began its modern development about a hundred years ago with the municipal system of Stein, and was completed with what is known as the *Kreis-ordnung,* the provincial and district organization, to which we may attach the name of von Gneist, though others participated in its creation. Under it the most honest, efficient, and prosperous communal life which the world has ever known has been produced and developed. No slums, no illiteracy, and no proletariat are to be found in any German city or commune, while the control is more

genuinely democratic and the distribution of the fruits of civilization is more even and general than what prevails in any other country.

To me the attempt made in Great Britain and the United States to represent Heinrich von Treitschke as the fashioner of German institutions and policies seems, to say the least, disingenuous. I knew von Treitschke well. He was my teacher, and I felt great admiration for his brilliant rhetorical powers and his enthusiastic nationalism. I never took him very seriously, and I never knew that anybody else did. He said a great many sound and sensible things and some extravagant things. The sound things are, however, never quoted now, but his extravaganzas are developed into caricatures. He was a man largely shut away from practical personal intercourse with the world by his extreme deafness, and was a prey to his own imagination. I remember distinctly a conversation with him in the year 1878, in which he told me that orthodox political economy was not

then well represented in the Berlin University, that a young teacher named Adolf Wagner, with socialistic leanings, was guiding the students astray, and that the Faculty of Philosophy in the University had requested him, Treitschke, to deliver a course of lectures on political economy as an offset to Wagner's influence and that he was preparing the course. But those of us who are acquainted with German institutions know now that Germany has followed Wagner, rather than von Treitschke, in the development of its economic institutions, and that the democratic socialistic system of pensions and insurance, through which a more even distribution of wealth between capital and labor has been attained in Germany than elsewhere, is to be attributed, in large part at least, to Wagner and not at all to von Treitschke. And yet I have not seen the name of Adolf Wagner mentioned a single time in any American newspaper since the outbreak of this war.

Neither had vonTreitschke any more influence upon the development of the political

institutions of the Empire than of the economic institutions. As I remember him, he was a member of the National Liberal party, and a staunch Unionist; but the leader of the party at that time was Edward Lasker, who certainly did a vast deal more than von Treitschke in forming its principles and policies and in securing the legislation which that party left upon the statute book of the Empire; and yet I have never seen the mention of Edward Lasker's name in any American newspaper since the outbreak of this war.

The man, however, who, after the formation of the Empire, exercised, next to Bismarck himself, the largest influence upon the development of Germany's political and judicial institutions was Rudolf von Gneist, Professor and Rector in the Berlin University, chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the Reichstag, and teacher of Prince William, now the German Emperor, in political science and public law. I knew this man well also. I attended his lectures and worked in his seminar. He was a great student of English

and American institutions. He spent years in England investigating the working of the British Government from highest to lowest instance. He wrote the two monumental works: *The Administrative Law of England* and *Self Government in England,* and it was under the influence of the principles put forth in these that local administration in Germany has been modified and reformed in no inconsiderable degree. Moreover, it was Professor von Gneist who contended that the German imperial courts had, from the nature of written constitutional law, the power to nullify any legislative act they might be called upon to apply, which, in their opinion, contravened the provisions of the Constitution, one of the most fundamental principles of genuine constitutional government, as we Americans well know. And yet I have never seen the name of Professor von Gneist mentioned in any American newspaper since the outbreak of this war.

Everything has been done, and done systematically, and done according to a seem-

ingly long-matured and sinister plan to give the American people not simply an erroneous, but an absolutely false, conception of German institutions, purposes, and aspirations. But all this is vain and futile, short-sighted and injurious. As Lincoln said, "You can fool all the people some of the time and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all of the time." The Destiny which rules this world will sooner or later sweep away this veil of falsehood, deceit, and hypocrisy and will place that one of the two systems I have described in the van of civilization's onward march which will bring to mankind as a whole the largest store of the fruits of civilization, most evenly distributed among all the members of the human race.

This might, conceivably, be accomplished through peaceable development, but in the past it has been chiefly done through the upheavals of war. And it may be that this is just what is happening now. It may be that mankind is now being called upon to make its

selection, or, more correctly, to see the selection made for it through the mighty events now transpiring, between the two systems above delineated: on the one hand, the system of the Colonial Empire, with its upper ten thousand rolling in wealth, splendor, and luxury and its hundreds of thousands, nay millions, groveling in ignorance, want, misery and crime; with its grip upon a quarter of the earth's land surface and a quarter of mankind of all races and colors as its subjects; with its continual territorial expansion through intrigue, war, and bloodshed; with its sovereignty over the high seas and a vast naval power to sustain it, which may, at any moment, shut up the ports of any other country and cut it off from any communication with the outside world, and, in many cases, starve it into submission to its will; with its unlimited government in the hands of a small group of men responsible only to a little larger group, a small group of men who do not hesitate to commit the Empire in secret agreements and under-

standings of the most momentous nature; and with its necessity to destroy by force any successful rival in the world's trade; or, on the other hand, the system of national states of moderate and substantially permanent areas and of homogeneous populations; with constitutionally limited government participated in, through the federal system, by the representative men of every section; with a fair distribution of the fruits of civilization so that there shall be no illiteracy, no pauperism and little crime; with agriculture and industry so developed and balanced that each nation may substantially provide itself with the necessities of life; with manufactures which, by their excellence alone, will command markets; with no compelling necessity, therefore, for colonies and dependencies nor for wars through which to acquire them; and with the whole world as an open field where intelligence, capacity, honesty, and industry will not be cheated by brute force of their just reward.

Which of these systems now is the system

for the twentieth century? Which will lead mankind to the higher plane of civilization? Which is best calculated to give mankind prosperity and peace? I divine that this is the great problem for the solution of which Europe is now writhing in the agony of a great labor pain of human development, and while God grant that we may escape active participation in the suffering, we cannot avoid having our own interests most profoundly involved in the outcome. Let us make sure that we correctly conceive what those interests are and how they will be best subserved.

CHAPTER IV

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR

I SEE the prophecy so often expressed that something terrible may come to us and to the world through German Militarism, while British Navalism passes almost unchallenged, that I wonder whether one of the qualities of the prophet is that he is constituted without memory. I do not think that I possess any of the qualities of the prophet, certainly not the one just mentioned, for I find myself always going back a few steps in order to get direction and momentum for every new spring forward. After all, this seems to me the surer way. It certainly is when there is such rich experience from which to draw as there is upon the subject of our relation to German Militarism and British Navalism.

We may say that our experience with both begins with and extends through our exist-

ence here. In our Colonial Period almost the entire western border of our country was occupied by Germans. It fell to them, therefore, to defend, in first instance, the colonists from the attacks of the French and the Indians. They formed what was known in those times as the Regiment of Royal Americans, a brigade rather than a regiment, numbering some four thousand men, and the bands led by Nicholas Herkimer and Conrad Weiser. Many of the men composing these bodies had been schooled in military tactics and discipline in their German fatherland and the service which they rendered in creating, organizing, and drilling this little army of some six thousand men cannot be overestimated. It enabled us to resist successfully the French and their Indian allies in the Seven Years War, which they made upon us from 1756 to 1763, and it gave us a nucleus for our Revolutionary Army. At the outbreak of our War of Independence, Herkimer, Mühlenberg, and Schlatter gathered the Germans in the Mohawk Valley and the Vir-

ginia Valley together and organized them into companies for service. Baron von Ottendorff, another German soldier, recruited and drilled the famous Armand Legion. And when Washington's first bodyguard was suspected of treasonable sentiments and plans, it was dismissed and a new bodyguard consisting almost entirely of Germans was formed. This new bodyguard was supported by a troop of cavalry consisting entirely of Germans, under the command of Major Barth von Heer, one of Frederick the Great's finest cavalry officers. This troop stood by Washington during the entire war, and twelve of them escorted him to Mt. Vernon when he retired.

But the greatest contribution of German Militarism to the cause of our independence was Baron von Steuben, the famous aide de camp of Frederick the Great. He came to us at the most critical period of the Revolution, that awful winter of 1777-78, when the remnant of our forces, a small band of ragged, starved, and discouraged militiamen,

were trying to keep body and soul together at Valley Forge. He shared their sufferings. He introduced the Prussian organization, discipline, and drill among them. In a few months he made a real army out of them, which turned defeat into victory and made our independence possible. He then proceeded to the south and organized and disciplined the army for General Greene. He was present at the siege of Yorktown, and, as the only American officer who had ever witnessed the storming of a fortified place, he rendered most invaluable service, and it was his fortune to be in command in the trenches when the British flag was hauled down.

And besides Steuben, there were Baron de Kalb, the most brilliant cavalry officer; Johann Schott, the most efficient artillery officer; General Lutterloh, the quartermaster general, and Christopher Ludwig, the master purveyor, all Germans, who had had the training of German Militarism. It is not too much to say that German Militarism

did probably as much as any other one thing to make our final triumph over Great Britain in our war for independence possible.

But we have had another and more recent war for our National existence: the war of 1861-65, the Civil War, as we of the North called it; the War between the States, as they of the South called it. Let us see if German Militarism played any part in that great struggle, and if so, what that part was.

Everyone, even only slightly acquainted with the history of this war, knows that the question of first and greatest importance which arose and demanded solution was that of the position in the struggle of the border slave States, namely: Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Mr. Lincoln's administration gave its attention most seriously and anxiously to the work of holding these States back from passing secession ordinances, and preventing them from being occupied by the armies of the Southern Confederacy.

The most important among these States was Missouri. It was the largest; it reached

away up into the very heart of the North; it commanded the left bank of the Mississippi for some five hundred miles; and the great United States arsenal of the West, containing the arms and munitions for that whole section of our country, was located in St. Louis. It had been stacked to its utmost capacity by the Secretary of War of the preceding administration, Mr. Floyd of Virginia, in the expectation that it would certainly fall into the hands of the South. The Governor of the State, C. F. Jackson, manifested the stand he would take in his reply to President Lincoln's requisition for Missouri's quota of the first call for troops. He defied the President in the words: "Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its object; inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied with."

It happened most fortunately, however, that the commandant of the arsenal was a staunch Unionist, Nathaniel Lyon. He immediately recognized the peril of the situation. He had only three men to guard the

arsenal and there was in the city a full company of secessionist militia calling themselves Minute Men. Moreover, two companies of the state militia composed of Germans had shortly before been disarmed by the general of the State militia. Under these conditions Lyon turned to F. P. Blair for advice. Blair was acquainted with the views and sympathies of the inhabitants perfectly, and knew that he could rely only upon the Germans to save the arsenal and then the city and the State for the Union.

The Germans of the city were organized in Turner-Unions, in which they had, besides practicing gymnastics, kept up their knowledge of military drill and evolutions. After some hesitation, during which the movements of the secessionists to seize the arsenal became more and more threatening, Lyon called the German Turners into the arsenal, armed them thoroughly and garrisoned the place with them. Five regiments of Germans were now hastily organized and armed. They were the regiments commanded by Blair,

Börnstein, Sigel, Schüttner, and Salomon. The arsenal and city were now safe, and some thirty thousand stands of arms with munitions were sent over into Illinois to arm the Illinois troops for the occupation of Missouri. This was the first great service which German Militarism rendered to the cause of the Union in the perilous month of April, 1861.

It would fill a volume to recite the services which followed this throughout those terrible four years, during which Union was preserved and slavery destroyed. Without the Germans, who almost to a man knew military drill, discipline, and organization, I do not know how we could have prepared our armies for the work which they were called upon to do. The people of the North were unaccustomed to the use of arms, knew little of military organization, and were restive under discipline. We had our Westpointers and they were good, but far too few in number to train the vast hosts of raw recruits which were now called under arms. The

two hundred thousand native born Germans who served in our armies were nearly all of them experienced in the use of arms and accustomed to the severities of military discipline. A very large proportion of these were engaged as officers in teaching our men to become soldiers. Among the taught were nearly four hundred thousand men of German descent, many of whom, through their practices in their Turn-and-Schützen Hallen, were the quickest of all our volunteers to become efficient soldiers.

The German and German-American contingent in our armies amounted thus, first and last, to some five hundred thousand soldiers. They were led by men such as Heinzelman, Rosecrans, Schurz, Sigel, Osterhaus, Willich, Hartranft, Steinwehr, Wagner, Hecker, and a thousand others. Mrs. Jefferson Davis, the wife of the Confederate President, has often said to me that without the Germans the North could never have overcome the armies of the Confederacy; and unless that had been accomplished then, this Continent

would have been, since then, the theater of continuous war instead of the home of peace.

Now let us contrast with these great services of German Militarism to our independence and our National existence, the injuries which British Navalism, to say nothing of British Militarism, has inflicted upon us.

We will begin with the Declaration of Independence, as I suppose it is still in order to cite that document in these United States. In it we meet the following statements: "He," that is the King, the British Government, "has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, cut off our trade with all parts of the world." Perhaps the opinion of the day may hold that we were then his own and he could do with us as he would. I will, therefore, not dwell longer upon the treatment which we received from the British Government during our Colonial period.

No sooner had we become by successful resistance independent of Great Britain than she began harassing us in every possible way

upon the sea, legally and illegally. Her war ships stopped our merchantmen, no matter where they were going or what they were carrying, and not only took what their officers termed contraband of war out of them, but took our crews out of them and impressed them into the British naval service under the claim that they were British citizens, which, in most cases at least, was not true, and whether they were or not, they could not be lawfully taken from American ships. The British Navy went so far in this matter, as to stop by force our own war ships and search them for British seamen, and in several cases, notably in that of our frigate, the Chesapeake, June 22, 1807, actually took men out of our war ships and impressed them into the service of the British Navy.

At that time Great Britain was off-and-on engaged in war with France, and during such periods had, of course, the right to blockade the French ports and those of the allies of France. But there was a law of blockade which required as the condition of this situa-

tion that armed vessels in sufficient power to repel ordinary attempts to enter must be present before the port blockaded and notice must have been given of the actual existence of the blockade. Great Britain paid no attention to these limitations. She declared all the ports of France, of her allies, and of her colonies blockaded, whether they were so or not, and seized American vessels, among others, far out upon the high seas under the claim that they were headed for ports declared by Great Britain to be in a state of blockade, or had upon them goods the product or manufacture of countries at enmity with Great Britain. The British Government also issued the entirely arbitrary order that trade between a country and its colonies, not permitted to the ships of other nations in time of peace, could not be opened to them by that country in time of war between that country and another power. For twenty years, from 1792 to 1812, Great Britain imposed upon us all of these practices, unlawfully, arbitrarily, and arrogantly until

finally we could stand it no longer and we threw down the gage of battle.

The war began for us rather successfully, almost brilliantly, on the water. Our improvised Navy did at first excellent work, but at the beginning of 1814 we had hardly a vessel of any kind left upon the sea. The British fleet had, moreover, from its Government the explicit and distinctly expressed order "to destroy and lay waste all towns and districts of the United States found accessive to the attack of the British armaments," and it followed these instructions effectively. From the Bay of Fundy to the Chesapeake our ports were blockaded and our towns reduced to ashes, and finally the City of Washington was captured by the expedition up the Chesapeake, and the Capitol, the President's Mansion, and the public buildings were plundered and burned to the ground. When we emerged from the war of 1812-15 we had neither navy nor merchant marine and in the Treaty of Peace, Great Britain renounced none of her

arbitrary practices upon the sea. The war brought little relief from the tyranny of British Navalism.

During the next forty years we constructed slowly and with much difficulty our new Navy and merchant marine, and in 1860 there was again some prospect of our becoming a maritime power. Then came the outbreak of the Civil War and Great Britain saw again her opportunity to reduce us once more to weakness. Hardly a month passed before she recognized the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy. The Confederacy had no navy, but it had licensed some privateers, which, during the first few months of the rebellion, made capture of a considerable number of our merchantmen. In a very short time, however, these privateers were all either captured by the vessels of the United States Navy or were shut up in the southern ports by the quite effective blockade. There was no probability, therefore, that any foreign power would be brought into any contact whatever with the Confederacy and

no need, therefore, of recognizing it as belligerent, or as anything.

When Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our newly appointed Minister to Great Britain, arrived at Liverpool on May 13, 1861, he was met by this declaration of recognition by the British Government of the belligerency of the Southern Confederacy. He saw at a glance that Lord Palmerston's Government "desired," as Mr. Gladstone afterwards expressed it, "the severance"—that is the separation of our country—"as a diminution of a dangerous power." It looked to Mr. Adams as if the British recognition of the *independence* of the Confederacy might follow at any moment. The anti-Slavery sentiment in England upon which he had counted seemed utterly eclipsed by something else and that something he soon found to be nothing more elevated than commercial greed.

The British Government and the British nation were possessed by the prospect of monopolizing the trade and commerce of

the cotton-raising Southern Confederacy and had neither eye nor ear for anything else. Such motives usually seek to hide themselves behind some profession of virtue or some violent indignation at the claimed iniquity of others. Mr. Adams found this American iniquity with which the British Government and public were deadening the consciousness of their real purpose to be the caricature of the personalities of Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward. Mr. Henry Adams, the Minister's son and Private Secretary, wrote:

> London created a nightmare of its own, and gave it the shape of Abraham Lincoln. Beside this it placed another demon, if possible more devilish, and called it Mr. Seward. In regard to these two men English society seemed demented. Defense was useless; explanation was vain; one could only let the passion exhaust itself. One's best friends were as unreasonable as enemies, for the belief in poor Mr. Lincoln's brutality and Mr. Seward's ferocity became a dogma of popular Faith. . . . *The London Times* and all its satellites were as usual doing the yellow work for the Foreign Sec-

retary, printing every morning in great head lines the words: "Another Disastrous Federal Defeat;" and the Cabinet Ministers were calling gleefully to each other that "the Federals had got another licking."

The first real opportunity came to show their official animus in the Trent affair in November of 1861. Our Captain Wilkes had read his international law concerning contraband of war in British textbooks and supposed that he had both British principle and British precedent for taking the Confederate Envoys, Mason and Slidell, out of the British merchantmen, the *Trent,* and conveying them upon his own ship as prisoners to Boston. He had made the little mistake of not bringing the *Trent* along too and delivering ship and Envoys to the jurisdiction of a prize court of the United States. It was enough, however, in the existing temper of the British Government to lead to demonstrations.

So soon as the news of Wilkes' act arrived in England, although Mr. Adams

communicated to the British Government instructions to him from Washington disavowing responsibility for the act and expressing readiness to discuss the matter, preparations for war were instantly begun. The arsenals resounded with activity and troops were embarked for America. We liberated the Confederate Envoys promptly and the British Government was obliged to see this opportunity escape them.

Mr. Adams and the Washington Government knew, however, from that moment onward the hostile disposition which they would be compelled to encounter at every point. It was entirely evident to Mr. Adams that the British Government, led by Palmerston, Russell, and Gladstone, were working, and would work, on the assumption that the Southern Confederacy was a *fait accompli.* He undoubtedly conveyed this information to Mr. Seward, who sent over our most accomplished politician, Thurlow Weed, and our most accomplished lawyer, William M. Evarts, to convince the

politicians and the people of their mistaken opinion and to assist Mr. Adams in avoiding the legal pitfalls which might be laid for him. He needed them both.

Already during the months when the controversy over the Trent affair was taking its course, one James D. Bulloch arrived in England as the agent of the Southern Confederacy for securing the construction and equipment of a Confederate Navy. The laws of Great Britain were construed to permit this, by the simple subterfuge of keeping the vessel and the armament separate until they passed the territorial limit of the British jurisdiction. And the British Government did not recognize any international law outside of the Acts of Parliament or specific treaty obligations.

In spite of the protests of Mr. Adams that Great Britain was at least violating the obligations of neutrality in permitting ships of war to be constructed in her ports for the Confederates, who, according to Great Britain's own conception of the belligerency

of the Confederates, were our enemies, the British Government allowed the work to go on, until a number of cruisers of the most formidable type were built and equipped and let loose upon the merchant marine of the United States for its destruction, and they destroyed it pretty effectually to *the advantage of the British carrying trade upon the high seas.*

Encouraged by the success of their own arbitrariness and our inability to meet it under the strain of our domestic conflict, the British Government became more and more reckless and arrogant. In the year 1863, the Lairds at Birkenhead constructed a number of steam rams, completely equipped, inside of the jurisdiction of the British Government, for the Confederates. Mr. Adams protested to Lord Russell with all the vigor of his vigorous nature, but at first in vain. In the midst of the controversy, however, came the news of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Taking advantage of the influence of these victories over the minds of the British

Ministers and upon the opinion of the British public, Mr. Adams addressed his famous note of September 5, 1863, to Lord Russell, in which he distinctly accused the British Government with connivance in the Confederate armaments, and closed his communication with the words: "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war." This was something which the British Government understood, and three days afterwards Mr. Adams received from Lord Russell information that his Government had given instructions forbidding the departure of the two Ironclads.

This did not, however, serve to quiet the indignation of the people of the United States against the British Government and people, and the desire to make stiff demands upon that Government and back them up with the great military power with which the Union emerged from the Civil War was very general and very pronounced. The British Government saw that we were in earnest and gave consent to a treaty with

us in January, 1869, which the Senate of the United States regarded as no sufficient promise of redress for the injuries done us, and promptly rejected it.

In his message to Congress of December 6, 1869, President Grant denounced this proposed agreement most unsparingly. He said:

Towards the close of the last administration a convention was signed in London for the settlement of all outstanding claims between Great Britain and the United States, which failed to receive the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. The time and the circumstances attending the negotiations of that treaty were unfavorable to its acceptance by the people of the United States, and its provisions were wholly inadequate for the settlement of the grave wrongs that had been sustained by this government, as well as by its citizens. The injuries resulting to the United States by reason of the course adopted by Great Britain during our late Civil War in the increased rates of insurance, in the diminution of exports and imports and other obstructions to domestic industry and production, in its effect upon the foreign commerce of the country, in the decrease and *transfer* to *Great Britain of*

*our commercial marine,** in the prolongation of the war and the increased cost, both in treasure and in lives, of its suppression, could not be adjusted and satisfied as ordinary commercial claims which continually arise among commercial nations; and yet the convention treated them as such ordinary claims, from which they differ more widely in the gravity of their character than in the magnitude of their amount, great even as is that difference. Not a word was found in the treaty, and not an inference could be drawn from it to remove the sense of the unfriendliness of the course of Great Britain in our struggle for existence, which had so deeply and universally impressed itself upon the people of this country. Believing that a convention thus misconceived in its scope and inadequate in its provisions would not have produced the hearty, cordial settlement of pending questions which alone is consistent with the relations which I desire to have firmly established between the United States and Great Britain, I regard the action of the Senate in rejecting the treaty to have been wisely taken in the interests of peace and as a necessary step in the direction of a perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries. A sensitive people, conscious of their power, are more at ease under a great wrong wholly unatoned than under the re-

* Italics mine, J. W. B.

straint of a settlement which satisfies neither their idea of justice nor their grave sense of the grievances they have sustained.

Great Britain practically ignored this complaint, and another year slipped by with the relations between the two countries becoming more strained, when President Grant, on December 5, 1870, made the following communication to Congress:

I regret to say that no conclusion has been reached for the adjustment of the claims against Great Britain growing out of the course adopted by that government during the Rebellion. The cabinet of London, so far as its views have been expressed, does not appear to be willing to concede that Her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence, or did or permitted any act during the war by which the United States has just cause of complaint. Our firm and unalterable convictions are directly the reverse. I, therefore, recommend to Congress to authorize the appointment of a commission to take proof of the amount and the ownership of these several claims, on notice to the representative of Her Majesty at Washington, and that authority be given for the settlement of these claims

by the United States, so that the government shall have the ownership of the private claims, as well as the responsible control of all the demands against Great Britain.

The President had chosen well the moment to give Great Britain this warning. The French Empire was in the dust and the German Armies had surrounded Paris. With the well-known friendship existing between Germany and the United States this was no time for Great Britain to risk continuance of the misunderstanding with us. Early in January of 1871 a special envoy from the British Government, Sir John Rose, appeared in Washington. The result of the negotiations springing out of this advance was the Treaty of Washington of 1871 between Great Britain and the United States, according to which all the questions arising out of the contentions between Great Britain and the United States concerning the incidents of the Civil War should be referred for arbitration to a Tribunal of five members, one appointed by the President of the

United States, one by the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, one by the King of Italy, one by the President of Switzerland, and one by the Emperor of Brazil; the question of the Northwest Boundary of the United States should be referred to the German Emperor; and the Fisheries question to a Board of three commissioners, one appointed by the President of the United States, one by the British Queen, and the third by the President and the Queen jointly, and in case they could not agree, by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at the British Court.

When the Geneva Tribunal met and the United States laid its claims before it, the British Government virtually declined to submit to the arbitration of the claims for what were termed "National and indirect losses," that is "losses in the transfer of the American commercial marine to the British flag, in the enhanced payment of insurance and in the prolongation of the war and the addition of a large sum to the cost of the war

and the suppression of the Rebellion." The Tribunal announced that it felt constrained to throw them out as not being a good foundation in International Law for computing and awarding damages. The Tribunal awarded us a very moderate sum for the reimbursement of direct private losses, but the vastly greater national and indirect losses have never been compensated or atoned for in the slightest degree.

The boundary question between the United States and British Columbia submitted to the German Emperor was decided by His Majesty in an award, announced in October of 1872, sustaining the claim of the United States.

On the other hand, the fisheries question presents another instance of British practices in diplomacy. When it came to the appointment of the Commissioners, the President appointed one, the British Government one, and the British Government proposed, as the third member to be appointed by the two governments conjointly, one Maurice Del-

fosse, the Belgian Minister to the United States. President Grant rejected Delfosse on the ground that the interests of Great Britain and Belgium were altogether too closely allied. Great Britain would not accept anybody proposed by the United States, and so the choice of the third Commissioner fell, according to the provisions of the Treaty, to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at the British Court, Count Beust. He should, of course, have been informed by the British Government that Delfosse was excluded. Whether he was so informed we do not know, but he, nevertheless, appointed him as the third Commissioner.

Our Government was taken by surprise, but Mr. Fish, our Secretary of State, felt the embarrassment of resisting further the appointment of the Belgian Minister in Washington to be too great and acquiesced with the best grace possible. Great Britain had thus secured two of the three Commissioners and they proceeded to award a

payment of five million five hundred thousand dollars from our Government to Great Britain. It was a high-handed procedure and our Commissioner, Hon. E. H. Kellogg, dissented vigorously from the decision, but they had the letter of the law on us and we had to submit.

Thus three times in less than a hundred years of our history has Great Britain destroyed our merchant marine, and we have never yet recovered from the last experience. The competition which the Germans began to set up in the seventies and eighties of the last century proved a great relief to us. As the German merchant marine grew, freights were reduced and the comfort of travel greatly improved, and we were able to carry on our foreign trade and intercourse profitably in foreign bottoms. But now, having decided that the interests of her World-Empire can no longer suffer this competition, Great Britain has struck down the German commerce and forbids us to buy the interned ships with which to carry on

our foreign commerce, under pain of their seizure by the British Navy.

How many more instances do we need to demonstrate to us that the system of Colonial Empire with the dominance of the seas, and the unlimited territorial expansion which it claims, is not compatible with the freedom and prosperity of the world? Can any American with half an eye fail to see that our greatest interest in the outcome of this war is that the seas shall become free and neutral, and that, shall they need policing, this shall become international; that the open door for trade and commerce shall take the place of colonial restrictions or preferences, or influences and shall, in times of peace, be the universal principle; that private property upon the high seas shall be inviolable; that trade between neutrals in time of war shall be entirely unrestricted, and that contraband of war shall have an international definition?

In the second place, what American cannot see with half an eye that the destruction

of the German Empire and the advance of Russia to the controlling place in Continental Europe or even the lessening of the influence of the German Empire to the advantage of Russia — one of which things is bound to result from the triumph of the Allies in this war — would be injurious to American interests and would conflict with American ideals? Leaving out of account altogether the close educational bonds between Germany and the United States, closer than those subsisting between us and any other country, and the racial sympathies of a large part of our best population, let us look at the more practical and material interests involved.

In the first place, the German merchant marine intermediates our commerce for us in larger volume than all the countries of Continental Europe now at war with her, and has given us more satisfactory service than any of them. And, in the second place, the German trade with us exceeds in amount, by nearly fifty millions of dollars annually,

our trade with France, Russia, Belgium, Servia, and Montenegro, the five Continental European nations now at war with Germany, taken together.

Do we not wish to preserve this valuable trade?

Do we wish to see the paralyzing hand of the Muscovite laid upon this rich source of income to us?

But some of our all-wise newspaper editors say the German people will still be there, only the German Empire, as a political and governmental organization, will be destroyed. But I doubt very much if the German people will be there after the German Empire is destroyed. I think they will stand or fall together, for the German Empire is the national, self-ordained organization of the German people and without it they themselves know that they could not exist as a people in Middle Europe. They will uphold it so long as the breath of life is in them and they will lie down in death wrapt in its colors before they will

submit to the rule of the Slav, the Gaul, or the Briton.

I have, in the previous chapter, described briefly what this German Empire as a governmental organization is, but to impress it more deeply upon the minds of my readers, I will quote here what President Grant said of it soon after its formation, in his special message of February 7, 1871, to Congress:

> The Union of the States of Germany into a form of government similar in many respects to that of the American Union is an event that cannot fail to touch deeply the sympathies of the people of the United States.
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> This Union has been brought about by the long-continued persistent efforts of the people, with the deliberate approval of the governments and people of twenty-four* of the German States through their regularly constituted representatives. In it the American people see an attempt to reproduce in Europe some of the best features of our own Constitution with such modifications as the history and condition of Germany seem to require. The local governments of the several members of

* *Twenty-five, J. W. B.*

the Union are preserved, while the power conferred upon the Chief imparts strength for the purpose of self-defense, without authority to enter upon wars of conquest and ambition.

The cherished aspiration for national unity which for ages has inspired the many millions of people speaking the same language, inhabiting a contiguous and compact territory, but unnaturally separated and divided by dynastic jealousies and the ambition of short-sighted rulers, has been attained, and Germany now contains a population of about 34,000,000, united, like our own, under one government for its relation with other powers, but retaining in its several members the right and power of control of their local interests, habits, and institutions.

The bringing of great masses of thoughtful and free people under a single government must tend to make governments what alone they should be — the representatives of the will and the organization of the power of the people. The adoption in Europe of the American system of union under the control and direction of a free people, educated to self-restraint, cannot fail to extend popular institutions and to enlarge the peaceful influence of American ideas.

Such was the organization of the German Empire at the outset and such it has remained

to the present day. In view of all these things, how can any genuine American, with one grain of common sense and one spark of real patriotism left in him, unless he be blinded by prejudice or consumed by hypocrisy, regard with favor or even with unconcern the substitution of the Muscovite autocracy for this Great German system of government and economy in Central Europe, or the bringing of it in the slightest degree under the influence of the Muscovite autocracy? What American interest could he imagine to be advanced by it? What American idea to be furthered by it? If such an American should present himself before me, I confess that I would not know what to say to him; for, frankly speaking, it would seem to me that he were ignoring American interests altogether under some sinister foreign influence. To me it seems indisputable that every true American interest, moral and material, requires the maintenance of the German Empire in its present organization and power in Middle Europe.

Neither the veiled Autocracy of the East nor the Gallic Republic of the West can be spoken of on the same day with it as the producer of genuine liberty, real progress, and universal prosperity.

Finally, there is one more question of vast importance to the people of these United States involved in the outcome of this war. It is this, namely: What relation is the North American Continent to bear hereafter to the diplomacy and wars of Europe?

We had a doctrine, which was intended and, in some degree, calculated, to keep the American Continents out of European entanglements. It was first employed to prevent Spain and Portugal from reestablishing the colonial dependence of South and Middle America upon Europe, and to prevent Russia from extending the dependence of North America upon Europe. It certainly helped to accomplish the first. Today, of the nine millions of square miles of territory of South and Middle America inhabited by sixty millions of people, only about two

hundred thousand square miles, inhabited by less than five hundred thousand people, are colonially dependent upon Europe.

It also accomplished its purpose in regard to the second object. Nevertheless, more than the half of North America territorially remains today colonially dependent upon Europe. We have certainly been altruistic with our Monroe Doctrine. We have turned and twisted and developed and exaggerated it to get Europe out of South and Middle America, and yet we have permitted the very European state, which has always professed to believe in it, to hold on to the half of North America and to touch our own boundary for more than three thousand miles. At the close of our Civil War we got Russia off the Continent altogether by paying her seven millions of dollars for what was then regarded as a huge iceberg, and it is probably the greatest diplomatic and political blunder the United States ever made that it did not then get Great Britain off too. The population of Canada

at that time was only about three and a half millions of people, the majority of whom, probably, were inclined to annexation to the United States. Moreover, it had been brought quite clearly to our minds during our Civil War how easily Canada might be made a base of military operations against us. And lastly, we had at that moment the large, trained, and disciplined Army of seasoned veterans with which we could have struck down any physical opposition. It was an opportunity lost for freeing the North American Continent from colonial relations to Europe, which has never returned and may never return.

For more than twenty-five years, now, we have been consoling ourselves with the idea that the bond between Canada and Great Britain had become so attenuated that it might, at any moment, of itself snap asunder. But to our great surprise, almost to our consternation, we suddenly find that such is not the case, that, quite to the contrary, Canada is not only involved in the diplomacy and

politics of Europe, but in a great European War. By her colonial relationship to Great Britain she has been made belligerent in a European War and is now therefore subject, lawfully, to all the incidents of this condition, one of which is that she is open to invasion and conquest by the enemies of Great Britain. This will not probably happen in this war, but it can happen and it would be perfectly regular if it did, and it will probably happen in the war between Russia and Great Britain, which is certain to follow this war, in case the Allies are the victors. Now if this thing should happen tomorrow or at any time, I think it would put our neutrality to a very severe test. I would not be willing to vouch for its maintenance. We have not yet formed any real public opinion about this war. Everybody feels, but only relatively few really think, and very few possess the knowledge upon which to found a sound judgment. What we have now is a general state of excited feeling, which expresses itself in epithet, vituperation, and abuse,

which, therefore, engenders the hatreds that lead to war. With such a state of feeling the invasion of Canada by the enemies of Great Britain would in all probability excite us, however irrationally, to abandon the neutral ground, abandon peace, and become belligerent. Evidently the longer continuance of any colonial relation of any part of North America to Europe is not in our interests, not promotive of our welfare, and if one of the results of this war could be the severing of this bond completely, it would be so great a guarantee of our future peace and prosperity that we could well bear all the losses and inconveniences which the war is now imposing upon us.

But will this be effected by the triumph of the Allies? I cannot believe it. It seems to me that the triumph of the Allies will bind Canada still closer to the European and Asiatic policy of Great Britain, through comradeship in the war, participation in victory and through the increasing consciousness of the necessity for the parts of the

British Empire to stand together against Russia in the final struggle for the possession of Asia. And if Russia should win in this final struggle, as I verily believe, with Germany and Austria-Hungary destroyed and with Japan as her ally, she would, then Canada might be occupied by Russia or Japan and be administered by a satrap from Petrograd or Tokio.

As I see it, only the maintenance of the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, in at least the strength and coherence which they possessed on August 1, 1914, as the bulwark against Russian advance westward and southward, will bring any peace to the world and give to the North American Continent any prospect of ultimate deliverance from entanglements in European politics, controversies, and wars. There is little question in my mind that with the experience of this war our next formulation of the Monroe Doctrine will be that there shall be no colonial dependencies in North America on any European power. This will be

intelligible, clear cut, and reach to the root of the matter. Its realization, without the employment of force by us, will, however, be attained only by Canada's being brought through the discouragement of defeat in this present war to the consciousness of the un-American nature of her present adventure and its dangers to the independence and welfare of North America. These are the things which we should consider now. They are the things which we will consider when we emerge from the stage of emotion and advance into the stage of reflection.

CHAPTER V

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE AND THE CRIME AT SARAJEVO

IN the first chapter of this work I compared the assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg Throne with the supposed assassination of a Vice-President of these United States. The comparison proves more, however, than was there claimed for it. It is one thing to murder the Vice-President or even the President of a Republic, but a far more serious thing to murder the dynastic successor to a throne, especially when the purpose is manifest to destroy the dynasty itself. It may, indeed, be true that the Vice-President or the President of the Republic may be far more worthy individually, both as to intelligence, character, and capacity, than the Crown Prince, and it may be that the Republic is a higher form of political organization than the Monarchy,

but this is not at all the question here involved. The question is as to the effect of such a catastrophe upon the security and existence of the state concerned.

The Republic has not only a law of succession to the office of its chief magistracy, but a law of election for the creation of a new chief Magistrate. The Monarchy, however, has only the former. The death of all those persons qualified by the law of succession to succeed to the powers of the throne brings the state face to face with a crisis for the solution of which its Constitution makes no adequate provision, because a dynasty is an historical product. It grows with the development of the state from little beginnings. Its roots reach out in every direction. Its official powers are intertwined with its rights to property. With the prosperity of the state it prospers, and it suffers with the adversities of the state. It gives its name to the institutions and monuments of the state, to its cities and highways and streets and bridges. Its deeds of glory and

victory are interlaced with the state's advancement and its defeats with the state's decline.

All this is peculiarly true of the Hapsburg Dynasty and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Our earliest historical knowledge of the Hapsburgers is furnished us by deeds of gifts made by them to pious purposes, dated in the year 1099. The donor in these, one Count Werner of Hapsburg, seems to have been a wealthy Swabian gentleman, nephew of Bishop Werner of Strasburg, the builder of the castle occupied by Count Werner, a gentleman of high ideals and philanthropic turn. The Castle Hapsburg was located on the river Aar some miles north of the present city of Lucerne in Switzerland, and it was from this centre that the power and possessions of the Hapsburgers spread east, west, north, and south. The Hapsburgers seem to have been favorites with the Roman-German Emperors of the Swabian House, Frederick Barbarossa and Frederick II, and received from these Emperors lands and offices. In

the early part of the thirteenth century, Albert, called the Wise, of Hapsburg, married a relative of the Emperor Frederick II, and the son of this marriage, Rudolf, became German King and Roman-German Emperor. From this position he was able to add the Margravates of Austria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria to his patrimonial possessions, and although the imperial-royal power passed for a time out of Hapsburg hands, they were, and continued to be, the chief family within the Roman-German Empire. In 1437 Albert II, of Hapsburg, wrested the crowns of both Bohemia and Hungary from the Emperor Sigismund and the next year became Roman-German Emperor, which great office now remained in the hands of the Hapsburgers down to 1806, when the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation was destroyed by Napoleon. The Hapsburgers then assumed the title of Emperors of Austria and proceeded to organize the political system now known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Out of how many elements, homogeneous, quasi-homogeneous, and heterogeneous, this state body has been composed and what the work of the Hapsburg Dynasty has been in welding them and in holding them together may be in some degree concluded from the titles of the Hapsburg Emperor. He is Emperor of Austria; King of Hungary, Bohemia, Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia, Galicia, and Lodomeria; Archduke of Austria; Grand Duke of Krakau; Duke of Salzburg, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, Bukowina, Upper and Lower Silicia, Auschwitz and Zator, Teschen, Friaul, Ragusa, and Zara; Prince of Siebenbürgen, Trent and Brixen; Margrave of Moravia, Upper and Lower Lusatia and Istria; Count of Hapsburg, Tyrol, Kyburg, Görz, Gradisca, Hohenembs, Feldkirch, Bregenz and Sonnenberg; Lord of Triest and Cattaro. I think I have omitted some and I know that I have not invented any.

It has been a prodigious work for the Hapsburg Dynasty to mould the Austro-

Hungarian Empire from these elements and it is a really wonderful product of unity in diversity which this Dynasty has wrought. Instead of beating down all local independence and obliterating all racial differences as the French Monarchy did, for example, in its development, the Hapsburg Dynasty has preserved a sphere of local independence and of racial diversity and has sought to reach down to fundamental principles in rights and policies upon which men of different race and religion can stand, and live in peace together.

If I should be asked to define the political system of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in a single sentence, I would call it a confederation of two States each with federal government. Austria is a State composed of seventeen autonomous Provinces. Each one of these Provinces has its own legislature elected by the voters and exercising all legislative power not reserved by the written Constitution to the Reichrath, the national legislature. The laws of the provinces are

executed by Crown appointees. The national legislature, the lower house of which is chosen by manhood suffrage of all citizens over twenty-four years of age, exercises the powers vested in it by the written Constitution.

Hungary is a federal union of two States, Hungary proper and the State of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia. Each one of these States has its own legislature, and this body, the members of the lower house of which are chosen by suffrage slightly removed by a very small tax qualification from the manhood suffrage of all citizens over twenty years of age, makes local laws. In order to form a national legislature for the two States in union a certain number of representatives from Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia sit in the legislature for Hungary proper. The laws of the two States separately are executed by the King of Hungary and his appointees, as also the laws of the Union.

These two States with federal Governments are then brought together in the Confederation, entitled the Austro-Hungarian

Empire. The bonds which hold them together are, first and most important, the Hapsburg Dynasty, whose head is Emperor, King, Archduke, Grand Duke, Prince, Margrave, Count, and Lord in all the different parts of the complex organization, and second, the House of Delegations, which is composed of an equal number of persons chosen by the National legislatures of Austria and of Hungary-Croatia. This Confederate Government has control of the Foreign Affairs, and the Army and Navy of the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire and of the finances in so far as they are related to these subjects. Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a territory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with its own legislature for local affairs, but without any representation in either the National Legislature of Austria or that of Hungary-Croatia.

I consider the Austro-Hungarian Empire as about the most interesting experiment in the political science of the twentieth century. The nineteenth century has given us the na-

tional state based largely upon unity of race, language and custom. While the system of national states related to each other only through treaty, international law, and diplomacy, is a vast advance over the system of universal empire, there still remains the danger of too great particularism, if every race and linguistic idiom is to be regarded as the proper foundation of a separate and sovereign state. There still remains the problem, therefore, of bringing together different races or fragments of different races and bodies of men of different tongues, inhabiting naturally connected territory, into a political and governmental union, which shall be free enough to preserve valuable race differences, but which shall go down deep enough in universal human nature to find a foundation of principle broad enough for men of different races to stand upon and feel at home upon, and thus to develop a nationality in ideals of a profounder sort than that resting upon race or language, one approaching nearer to the universal human.

No great state in Europe has addressed itself so assiduously and sincerely to the solution of this great problem as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It has brought together German, Magyar, Czech, Pole, Slovack, Moravian, Ruthenian, Croatian, Ruman, Serb, Italian, and Lodin, both Christian and Mohammedan, and for a full half-century held them together in the bonds of a peaceful empire. And it has done this not by the domination of one race over the others, but by a system which leaves to each race its language and local customs, and secures to each its due representation in the State and Imperial Governments, and which seeks to find principles of union so fundamentally human that all races may feel their national ideals and aspirations fulfilled under them.

This is what the British Chancellor of the Exchequer calls a "ramshackle" empire. I have no doubt it appears so to a man accustomed to see the British Empire governed by a handful of men seated in Downing street, London, who receive their authority

from a body in which only forty-five millions of men, inhabiting one hundred and twenty thousand square miles of territory, out of the five hundred millions of men, occupying the thirteen millions of square miles of territory of the British Empire, have any representation at all. But it is quite evident that this high British official has no appreciation or even conception at all of the great problem of race reconciliation in the bonds of a peaceful Empire, which Austria-Hungary has labored so honestly and sincerely to solve, and to the solution of which it has come nearer than any other great state in Europe.

And in this great work the Hapsburg Dynasty has played the leading part. I have often heard it said that the Emperor Francis Joseph is the only man in all Austria-Hungary, who can speak to every subject of the Empire in his own tongue. Through misfortune, suffering, and sorrow, frequently misunderstood, and at times abused and maligned, mediating, compromising, conceding, yielding, and sacrificing, this Grand Old

Man has worked on for more than sixty-five years to establish justice and harmony between the races and tongues and religions of his Empire, and no higher testimony to the success of his efforts, and those of his House, could be given than the united uprising of these races in this war for the defense of the integrity of the Empire and the protection of the Dynasty which has been its creator and continues to be its chief cementing bond.

Only in the light of these facts and considerations can we fully appreciate the magnitude of the crime at Sarajevo as one involving, in the highest degree, not only the honor but the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

CHAPTER VI

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY*

SO much has been said about Belgian neutrality, so much assumed, and it has been such a stumbling block in the way of any real and comprehensive understanding of the causes and purposes of the great European catastrophe, that it may be well to examine the basis of it and endeavor to get an exact idea of its scope and obligation.

Of course, we are considering here the question of guaranteed neutrality, not the ordinary neutrality enjoyed by all states not at war, when some states are at war; the difference between ordinary neutrality and guaranteed neutrality being that no state is under any obligation to defend the ordinary neutrality of any other state against infringe-

* This chapter and "The German Emperor" (chapter 8), appeared originally in the *New York Times*, and are reprinted here by the courtesy of that journal.

ment by a belligerent, and no belligerent is under any specific obligation to observe it. Guaranteed neutrality, is, therefore, purely a question of specific agreement between states.

On the 19th day of April, 1839, Belgium and Holland, which, from 1815 to 1830, had formed the United Kingdom of The Netherlands, signed a treaty of separation from, and independence of, each other. It is in this treaty that the original pledge of Belgian neutrality is to be found. This clause of the treaty reads: "Belgium in the limits above described shall form an independent neutral state and shall be bound to observe the same neutrality toward all other states." On the same day and at the same place, London, a treaty, known in the history of diplomacy as the Quintuple Treaty, was signed by Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria, and Russia, approving and adopting the treaty between Belgium and Holland. A little later, May 11, the German Confederation, of which both Austria and

Prussia were members, also ratified this treaty.

In the year 1866 the German Confederation was dissolved by the war between Austria and Prussia, occasioned by the Schleswig-Holstein question. In 1867 the North German Union was formed, of which Prussia was the leading State, while Austria and the German States south of the River Main were left out of it altogether. Did these changes render the guarantees of the treaty of 1839 obsolete and thereby abrogate them, or at least weaken them and make them an uncertain reliance? The test of this came in the year 1870, at the beginning of hostilities between France and the North German Union. Great Britain, the power most interested in the maintenance of Belgian neutrality, seems to have had considerable apprehension about it. Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister, said in the House of Commons: "I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an

assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

Proceeding upon this view, the British Government then sought and procured from the French Government and from the Government of the North German Union separate but identical treaties guaranteeing with the British Government the neutrality of Belgium during the period of the war between France and the North German Union, the so-called Franco-Prussian war, which had just broken out, and for one year from the date of its termination. In these treaties it is also to be remarked that Great Britain limited the possible operation of her military forces in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium to the territory of the state of Belgium. These treaties expired in the year 1872, and the present German Empire has never signed any treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium.

Moreover, between 1872 and 1914 Belgium became what is now termed a world power; that is, it reached a population of nearly 8,000,000 people; it had a well-organized, well-equipped army of over 200,000 men and powerful fortifications for its own defense; it had acquired and was holding colonies covering 1,000,000 square miles of territory, inhabited by 15,000,000 men, and it had active commerce, mediated by its own marine, with many, if not all, parts of the world. Now, these things are not at all compatible in principle with a specially guaranteed neutrality of the state which possesses them. The state which possesses them has grown out of its swaddling clothes, has arrived at the age and condition of maturity and self-protection, and has passed the age when specially guaranteed neutrality is natural.

From all these considerations, I think it extremely doubtful whether, on the first day of August, 1914, Belgium should have been considered as possessing any other kind

of neutrality than the ordinary neutrality enjoyed by all states not at war, when some states are at war. In fact, it remains to be seen whether Belgium itself had not forfeited the privilege of this ordinary neutrality before a single German soldier had placed foot on Belgian soil. A few months ago I received a letter from one of the most prominent professors in the University of Berlin, who is also in close contact with the Prussian Ministry of Education, a man in whose veracity I place perfect confidence, having known him well for ten years. He wrote: "Our invasion of Belgium was prompted in part by the fact that we had convincing proof that there were French soldiers already in Belgium, and that Belgium had agreed to allow the French Army to pass over its soil in case of a war between France and us." Moreover, in the British "White Paper" itself, No. 122, is to be found a dispatch from the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, to Sir Edward Grey, containing these words: "It appears from what he

[the German Secretary of Foreign Affiairs] said that the German Government consider that certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium." The date of this dispatch is July 31, days before the Germans entered Belgium.

But placing these two things entirely aside, as well as the new evidence found in the archives at Brussels, that Belgium had by her agreements with Great Britain forfeited every claim to neutrality in case of a war between Germany and Great Britain, evidence the genuineness of which has now been acknowledged by the British Government, I find in the British "White Paper" itself, No. 123, not only ample justification, but absolute necessity, from a military point of view, for a German army advancing against France, not only to pass through Belgium, but to occupy Belgium. This number of the "White Paper" is a communication dated August 1 from Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin. In it Sir Edward Grey informed Sir E. Goschen

that the German Ambassador in London asked him "whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium neutrality, we, Great Britain, would remain neutral," and that he [Grey] replied that he "could not say that," that he did not think Great Britain "could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone;" further, Sir Edward Grey says: "The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free."

After this Sir Edward Grey declared in Parliament, according to newspaper reports, that Great Britain stood, as to Belgian neutrality, on the same ground as in 1870. With all due respect, I cannot so understand it. In 1870 Great Britain remained neutral in a war between the North German Union

and France, and, with the North German Union, guaranteed Belgium against invasion by France, and, with France, guaranteed Belgium against invasion by the North German Union. On August 1, 1914, the German Empire asked Great Britain to do virtually the same thing, and Great Britain refused. It is, therefore, Germany who stood in 1914 on the same ground, with regard to Belgian neutrality, as she did in 1870, and it is Great Britain who shifted her position and virtually gave notice that she herself would become a belligerent. It was this notice served by Sir Edward Grey on the German Ambassador in London on August 1, 1914, which made the occupation of Belgium an absolute military necessity to the safety of the German armies advancing against France. Otherwise they would, so far as the wit of man could divine, have left their right flank exposed to the advance of a British army through Belgium, and there certainly was no German commander so absolutely bereft of all military knowledge

or instinct as to have committed so patent an error.

Belgium has Great Britain to thank for every drop of blood shed by her people, and every franc of damage inflicted within her territory during this war. With a million of German soldiers on her eastern border demanding unhindered passage through one end of her territory, under the pledge of guarding her independence and integrity and reimbursing every franc of damage, and no British force nearer than Dover, across the Channel, it was one of the most inconsiderate, reckless, and selfish acts ever committed by a great power when Sir Edward Grey directed, as is stated in No. 155 of the British "White Paper," the British Envoy in Brussels to inform the "Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power."

It is plain enough that Great Britain was

not thinking so much of protecting Belgium as of Belgium protecting her, until she could prepare to attack Germany in concert with Russia and France. She was willing to let Belgium, yea almost to command Belgium, to take the fearful risk of complete destruction in order that she might gain a little time in perfecting the cooperation of Russia and France with herself for the crushing of Germany, and in order to hold the public opinion of neutral powers, specially of the United States of America, in leash under the chivalrous issue of protecting a weaker country, which she has done little or nothing to protect, but which she could have effectively protected by simply remaining neutral herself.

We Americans have been greatly confused in mind in regard to the issues of this war. We have confounded causes and occasions and purposes and incidents until it has become almost impossible for any considerable number of us to form a sound and correct judgment in regard to it. But we shall emerge from that nebulous condition.

We are beginning to see more clearly now, and it would not surprise me greatly if the means used for producing our confusion would some day come back, if not to plague the consciences, at least to foil the purposes, of their inventors.

CHAPTER VII

THE EXPORT OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS TO BELLIGERENTS

TO one viewing the subject from a purely scientific and objective standpoint, the claim that an embargo by a neutral government of the sale of arms and munitions of war to belligerents is, under any circumstances or conditions, a violation of neutrality seems either sophistical or hypocritical and in either case unpatriotic. It is quite true that the inconsistency in principle still exists that a neutral government may not furnish nor allow its subjects to furnish ships of war to belligerents, but may allow its subjects to furnish the guns and munitions which give to vessels their formidable character as ships of war. But the permission to its subjects of furnishing arms and munitions to belligerents is the *right* of the neutral government, not

the *duty* of the neutral government to *the belligerent.*

The neutral government may permit or may not permit, as it may freely choose. Its duty is, that after having made its choice it must accord parity of treatment to all belligerents. That is, if it refuses to permit sales to one it must refuse to all and if it allows them to one it must allow them to all, in like manner and extent. Should it happen that conditions exist, or come to exist, independent of the power or the act of the neutral government, whereby any belligerent does not, or even cannot, make use of his opportunity to procure from the neutral, the neutral government is under no legal obligation to take any notice of this. If it be ready and willing to allow its subjects to furnish such belligerent, it will have discharged its duty of parity of treatment.

It is entirely free, however, to discontinue allowing its subjects to furnish to both, and neither has any right to complain if it does; for, as I have said, the permitting or the

forbidding its subjects to furnish is the *right* of the neutral government to be exercised by it at its own discretion and not *a duty* to the belligerent, to be rendered to him at his behest. Were this latter true, then the neutral would no longer be a free state, no longer sovereign. It would, in case of obligation to permit, be bound to the policy of the belligerent, the war policy of the belligerent.

The argument that where only one belligerent can take advantage of the permission to procure, the neutral government must continue to allow its subjects to furnish, on the ground that it would otherwise be depriving the belligerent of an advantage which the belligerent himself had won, or on the ground that it would thereby assist the other belligerent, is manifest sophistry and, if advanced by the neutral, is only a pretext for favoring the one belligerent. It is one of the most fundamental rules of international law that indirect consequences are not to be taken into account.

It was this principle which prevented us from getting anything out of Great Britain at Geneva in 1872, except the reimbursement of direct private losses. The hundredfold greater indirect losses have never been atoned for in the slightest degree.

If by any twist of logic, ceasing to help one belligerent directly can be held to be helping the other, then this latter assistance is indirect and is not taken into account in diplomatic or international reasoning or acts. And when we go over into the domain of morals, certainly, if there are two courses legally open to the neutral, one of which helps directly only one of the belligerents but the other helps both directly or neither, the neutral should follow the latter course.

At the present time and under present conditions only Great Britain and her allies can profit by our government's permitting the free sale of arms and munitions. These conditions are not of our government's making, and it does not in law need to take any notice of them, provided it be ready and

willing to allow Great Britain's enemies to be furnished in the same degree and measure. It is surely difficult to determine whether private parties are ready and willing to furnish both belligerents or not until the actual test should be made and made in each separate case. The majority of those now furnishing arms and munitions to Great Britain and her allies, under the permission of this government, are undoubtedly doing so, purely and simply, for the dollars there are in it. Such persons would undoubtedly furnish them to the enemies of Great Britain, or to His Satanic Majesty himself, if the opportunity offered and the payments were satisfactory. There are some who, besides the dollar inducement, desire to assist Great Britain and her allies against their enemies, and would probably find some way of avoiding the sale of arms and munitions to such enemies should the occasion arise. This would be unneutral, but how could it be dealt with?

Still further, there are unquestionably a few who think that by furnishing arms and

munitions to Great Britain and her allies alone the war may be shortened. Such persons also would probably find some way to avoid furnishing the enemies of Great Britain with the means of warfare, which, as I have said, would be unneutral indeed, but difficult, if not impossible, to deal with.

Finally, there is one man, so far as I know only one, who has assumed the firm, courageous, unselfish, and humane stand that he and his company will take no advantage of the permission of our Government to furnish arms and munitions to the belligerents in this war and has distinctly and definitely refused to fill any orders offered him. This man is Charles R. Bryson, President of the Electro-Steel Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Mr. Bryson says:

> We believe that the time is at hand when any firm or individual who accepts a contract to further add to the horrible slaughter now going on in Europe will do so to his own disgrace.

These words should be printed in gold and in letters large enough and upon a tower

high enough to be seen all over these United States. Mr. Bryson is right not only from the point of view of highest humanitarianism, but from every other point of view, practical and legal. It will bring no permanent gain to this country in dollars and cents to furnish the means for killing and maiming the men and destroying the property of Europe, thus lessening and crippling our legitimate trade with Europe in times of peace. It will not secure victory for Great Britain and her allies nor enable them to shorten the war that they alone can take advantage of the permission of our government to procure arms and munitions here, while their enemies cannot. We may reasonably conclude that Germany and her allies will not be able to invade the British Islands, and will not probably undertake to go much further into Russia, but they will, in all probability, hold the line substantially as now fixed so long as they desire, and there is no power on the face of the earth sufficient to crush the German Empire. At the begin-

ning of the War in 1756, Frederick the Great had five millions of souls to draw from and his enemies one hundred millions, and yet he waged war against them seven years and came out victorious. Today, the German Empire has alone seventy millions of souls to draw from and with its allies one hundred and sixty millions, while its enemies have all together not really three hundred millions of equal capacity. If Prussia could triumph over twenty to one in 1763, cannot that same Prussia, better prepared, more united and far more capable, hold her own against less than two to one in 1915? No, the furnishing of arms and munitions of war to Great Britain and her allies by the people of the United States will only prolong the war without altering the final result.

I verily believe that, except for that aid, the war would be very near its end, if not practically over, today; and I agree with Mr. Bryson that any man in this country who furnishes further the implements of death and destruction to the belligerents in this war

will do so "to his own disgrace." Mr. Bryson is also entirely right in assuming that he and his company do not violate the neutrality of the country in refusing to furnish arms and munitions of war to belligerents under any circumstances or conditions, nor would his government do so in forbidding them to be furnished. The contrary view is not only false as having no basis in international law, not only unpatriotic as subordinating the policy of our country to the war policy of a foreign country, but it is promotive of hypocrisy as turning the scales between conscience and dollars now balancing in the minds of many fairly honest men.

If men wish to sell arms and munitions of war to the belligerents for the dollars that are in it, let them say so. They have the legal right to do so, so long as the government permits it. If they wish to do this in order to help one belligerent against another, let them say so, for while this appears unneutral, there is no way to reach it, so long as our own government permits it. But let

us not encourage men to take refuge under the view that they *must* do so to preserve neutrality for that is false, unpatriotic, and hypocritical. Neither the individual nor the nation nor the government can, in the eye of God or in the eye of history, escape the guilt of having aided in the prolongation of this terrible war by seeking shelter under any such flimsy pretext, any such patent subterfuge.

CHAPTER VIII

THE GERMAN EMPEROR

IT is often said by historians that no truly great man is ever really understood by the generation, and in the age, for which he labors. Many instances of the truth of this statement can be easily cited. Two of the most flagrant have come within the range of my own personal experience. The first was the character of Abraham Lincoln as depicted by the British press of 1860-64 and as conceived by the British public opinion of that era. Mr. Henry Adams, son and private secretary of Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our Minister Plenipotentiary to Great Britain during that critical era in our history, writes in that fascinating book of his entitled *The Education of Henry Adams:*

London was altogether beside itself on one point, in especial; it created a nightmare of its

own, and gave it the shape of Abraham Lincoln. Behind this it placed another demon, if possible more devilish, and called it Mr. Seward. In regard to these two men English society seemed demented. Defense was useless; explanation was vain. One could only let the passion exhaust itself. One's best friends were as unreasonable as enemies, for the belief in poor Mr. Lincoln's brutality and Seward's ferocity became a dogma of popular faith.

Adams relates further that the last time he saw Thackeray at Christmas of 1863 they spoke of their mutual friend, Mrs. Frank Hampton of South Carolina, whom Thackeray had portrayed as Ethel Newcome, and who had recently passed away from life. Thackeray had read in the British papers that her parents had been prevented by the Federal soldiers from passing through the lines to see her on her death-bed. Adams writes:

In speaking of it Thackeray's voice trembled and his eyes filled with tears. The coarse cruelty of Lincoln and his hirelings was notorious. He never doubted that the Federals made a business of

harrowing the tenderest feelings of women — particularly of women — in order to punish their opponents. On quite insufficient evidence he burst into reproach. Had he (Adams) carried in his pocket the proofs that the reproach was unjust, he would have gained nothing by showing them. At that moment Thackeray, and all London society with him, needed the nervous relief of expressing emotions; for if Mr. Lincoln was not what they said he was, what were they?

Mr. Lincoln sent over our most skillful politician, Thurlow Weed, and our most able constitutional lawyer, William M. Evarts, and later our most brilliant orator, Henry Ward Beecher, followed, for the purpose of bringing the British people to their senses and correcting British opinion, but all to little purpose. Gettysburg and Vicksburg did far more toward modifying that opinion than the persuasiveness of Weed, the logic of Evarts, or the eloquence of Beecher, and it took Chattanooga, the March to the Sea, and Appomattox to dispel the illusion entirely.

Today we are laboring under a no less singular delusion than were the English in

1862. The conception prevailing in England and in this country concerning the physical, mental, and moral make-up of the German Emperor is the monumental caricature of biographical literature. I have had the privilege of his personal acquaintance now for nearly ten years. I have been brought into contact with him in many different ways and under many varying conditions; at Court and State functions, at university ceremonies and celebrations, at his table, and by his fireside surrounded by his family, when in the midst of his officials, his men of science, and personal friends, and, more instructive than all, alone in the imperial home in Berlin and Potsdam and in the castle and forest at Wilhelmshöhe. With all this experience, with all this opportunity for observation at close range, I am hardly able to recognize a single characteristic usually attributed to him by the British and American press of today.

In the first place, the Emperor is an impressive man physically. He is not a giant

in stature, but a man of medium size, great strength and endurance, and of agile and graceful movement. He looks every inch a leader of men. His fine gray-blue eyes are peculiarly fascinating. I saw him once seated beside his uncle, King Edward VII., and the contrast was very striking, and greatly in his favor.

In the second place, the Emperor is an exceedingly intelligent and highly cultivated man. His mental processes are swift, but they go also very deep. He is a searching inquirer, and questions and listens more than he talks. His fund of knowledge is immense and sometimes astonishing. He manifests interest in everything, even to the smallest detail, which can have any bearing upon human improvement. I remember a half-hour's conversation with him once over a cupping-glass, which he had gotten from an excavation in the Roman ruin called the Saalburg, near Homburg.

He always appeared to me most deeply concerned with the arts of peace. I have

never heard him speak much of war, and then always with abhorrence, nor much of military matters; but improved agriculture, invention, and manufacture, and especially commerce and education in all their ramifications were the chief subjects of his thought and conversation. I have had the privilege of association with many highly intelligent and profoundly learned men, but I have never acquired as much knowledge, in the same time, from any man whom I have ever met, as from the German Emperor. And yet, with all this real superiority of mind and education, his deference to the opinions of others is remarkable. Arrogance is one of the qualities most often attributed to him, but he is the only ruler I ever saw in whom there appeared to be absolutely no arrogance. He meets you as man meets man and makes you feel that you are required to yield to nothing but the better reason.

In the third place, the Emperor impressed me as a man of heart, of warm affections and of great consideration for the feelings and

well-being of others. He can not, at least does not, conceal his reverence for, and devotion to, the Empress, or his love for his children, or his attachment to his friends. He always speaks of Queen Victoria and of the Empress Friedrich with the greatest veneration, and once when speaking to me of an old American friend who had turned upon him, he said that it was difficult for him to give up an old friend, right or wrong, and impossible when he believed him to be in the right. His manifest respect and affection for his old and tried officials, such as Lucanus and zu Eulenburg and von Studt and Beseler and Althoff, give strong evidence of the warmth and depth of his nature. His consideration for Americans, especially, has always been remarkable. It was at his suggestion that the exchange of educators between the universities of Germany and of the United States was established, and it has been his custom to be present at the opening lecture of each new incumbent of these positions at the University of Berlin,

and to greet him and welcome him to his work. He is also the first to extend to these foreign educators hospitality and social attention.

To any one who has experienced his hearty welcome to his land and his home, the assertion that he is arrogant and autocratic is so far away from truth as to be ludicrous. Again I must say that I have never met a ruler, in monarchy or republic, in whom genuine democratic geniality was a so predominant characteristic.

But the characteristic of the Emperor which struck me most forcibly is his profound sense of duty and his readiness for self-sacrifice for the welfare of his country. This is a general German trait. It is the most admirable side of German nature. And the Emperor is, in this respect especially, their Princeps. I remember sitting beside him one day, when one of the ladies of his household asked me if I were acquainted with a certain wealthy, ultra-fashionable New York social leader. I replied, by name only.

She pressed me to know why not more nearly, why not personally. And to this I replied that I was not of her class; that I could not amuse her, and that I did not approve of the frivolous and demoralizing example and influence of one so favorably circumstanced for doing good. The Emperor had heard the conversation, and he promptly said: "You know in Germany we do not rate and classify people by their material possessions, but by the importance of the service they render to country, culture, and civilization." One of his sons once told me that from his earliest childhood his father had instilled into his mind the lesson that devotion to duty and readiness for sacrifice were the cardinal virtues of a German, especially of a Hohenzollern. His days are periods of constant labor and severe discipline. He rises early, lives abstemiously, and works until far into the night. There is no day laborer in his entire Empire who gives so many hours per diem to his work. His nature is manifestly deeply religious and,

in every sentence he speaks, evidence of his consciousness that the policeman's club cannot take the place of religious and moral principle is revealed. His frequent appeal for Divine aid in the discharge of his duties is prompted by the conviction that the heavier the duty the more need there is of that aid.

He undoubtedly has an intense desire, almost a passion, for the prosperity and greatness of his country, but his conception of that prosperity and greatness is more spiritual and cultural than material and commercial. More than once have I heard him say that he desired to see Germany a wealthy country, but only as the result of honest and properly requited toil, and that wealth acquired by force or fraud was more a curse than a blessing, and was destined to go as it had come. His conception of the greatness of Germany is as a great intellectual and moral power rather than anything else. Its physical power he values chiefly as the creator and maintainer of the conditions neces-

sary to the production and influence of this higher power. I have often heard him express this thought.

And in spite of this terrible war, the responsibility for which is by so many erroneously laid at his door, I firmly believe him to be a man of peace. I am absolutely sure that he has entered upon this war only under the firm conviction that Great Britain, France, and Russia have conspired to destroy Germany as a world power, and that he is simply defending, as he said in his memorable speech to the Reichstag, the place which God had given the Germans to dwell on. For seven years I myself have witnessed the growth of this conviction in his mind and that of the whole German Nation as the evidences of it have multiplied from year to year until at last the fatal hour at Sarajevo struck. I firmly believe that there is no soul in this wide world upon whom the burden and grief of this great catastrophe so heavily rest as upon the German Emperor.

I have heard him declare with the greatest

earnestness and solemnity that he considered war a dire calamity; that Germany would never during his reign wage an offensive war, and that he hoped God would spare him from the necessity of ever having to conduct a defensive war. For years he has been conscious that British diplomacy was seeking to isolate and crush Germany by an alliance of Latin, Slav, and Mongol under British direction, and he sought in every way to avert it. He visited England himself frequently. He sent his Ministers of State over to cultivate the acquaintance and friendship of the British Ministers, but rarely would the British King go himself to Germany or send his Ministers to return these visits.

More than once have I heard him say that he was most earnestly desirous of close friendship between Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, and had done, was doing, and would continue to do, all in his power to promote it, but that while the Americans were cordially meeting Germany

half way, the British were cold, suspicious, and repellent.

I know that the two things which are giving him the deepest pain in this world-catastrophe, excepting only the sufferings of his own kindred and people, are the enmity of Great Britain and the misunderstanding of his character, feelings, and purposes in America. To remedy the first we here can do nothing, but to dispel the second is our bounden duty; and I devoutly hope that other evidence may prove sufficient to do this to the satisfaction of the minds of my countrymen than was necessary to convince the British nation that the great-hearted Abraham Lincoln was not a brute nor the urbane William H. Seward a demon of ferocity.

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